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Article
The Evidence for Constitutionalization of
the WTO: Revisiting the Telmex Report
Theodore Kill∗
ABSTRACT
The discourse surrounding constitutionalization of the
WTO remains divisive and contentious. Despite the fact that
arguments for and against constitutionalization of the WTO
derive much of their cogency from their potential to affect
material outcomes within the multilateral trading system, the
literature remains silent with regard to case studies of exactly
how a particular constitutional conception has concretely
impacted the WTO Dispute Settlement System. This article
fills that gap by demonstrating how the concept of “rightsbased constitutionalism” was central to the coherence of the
Panel
Report
in
Mexico—Measures
Affecting
Telecommunications Services. In its Report, the panel resolved
several threshold issues of first impression regarding the
concepts of interconnection, accounting rates and the mode of
supply of basic telecommunications services. The panel’s
treatment of these legal issues has been criticized by many
commentators. With the benefit of the constitutional discourse
that has blossomed in the years following the report, however,
this article argues that the apparent inconsistencies within the
∗ Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State. I am grateful for the
comments of Robert Howse on a very early version of this article. I thank the
participants of the 2009–10 SIAS Summer Institute on Comparative Federalism
and Separation of Powers, and in particular Professors Daniel Halberstam and
Christoph Möllers, for helping me to explore the issues of global constitutionalism
underpinning this article. This article was drafted and completed before my
employment with the U.S. Department of State. The views expressed herein are
my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Government or the
Department of State.
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Telmex Report can best be understood as the product of a
particular vision of the WTO as a constitutional order
established to safeguard the rights of individuals within the
multilateral trading system.
INTRODUCTION
The debate regarding constitutionalization of the World
1
Trade Organization (“WTO”) can at times reach a fever pitch.
The battle lines are typically drawn at a high degree of
abstraction centering around principles of constitutional justice
2
or global subsidiarity. Ideas such as these derive their cogency
from their ability to affect material outcomes within the
multilateral trading system, yet the literature remains silent
with regard to case studies of exactly how a particular
constitutional conception has concretely impacted the WTO
3
Dispute Settlement System. This article fills that gap by
demonstrating
how
the
concept
of
“rights-based
4
constitutionalism” was central to the coherence of the WTO
Panel
Report
in
Mexico—Measures
Affecting
5
Telecommunications Services (“Telmex Report”).

1. See, e.g., Robert Howse, Human Rights, International Economic Law and
Constitutional Justice: A Reply, 19 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 945 (2008); Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and Constitutional
Justice: A Rejoinder, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 955 (2008).
2. Petersmann, supra note 1, at 956.
3. The WTO Dispute Settlement System is a term used to encompass the
complete range of dispute resolution mechanisms and institutions available to
WTO Members within the WTO. The system “function[s] very much like a court of
international trade: there is compulsory jurisdiction, disputes are settled largely by
applying rules of law, decisions are binding on the parties and sanctions may be
imposed if decisions are not observed.”
MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J.
SCHOENBAUM & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW,
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 104 (2d ed. 2006).
4. See generally DEBORAH Z. CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGITIMACY, DEMOCRACY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM 145 (2005). Howse and Nicolaïdis refer to this
vein of constitutionalism as “libertarian.” Throughout this paper, however, I will
use the term “rights-based constitutionalism.” Robert Howse and Kalypso
Nicolaïdis, Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the WTO Is
a Step Too Far, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 227, 236 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001).
5. Panel Report, Mexico—Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services,
WT/DS204/R (Apr. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Telmex Report].
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The Telmex Report formed part of a long simmering trade
dispute between the United States and Mexico regarding
telecommunications traffic between the two countries. In
bringing the dispute to the WTO, the United States alleged
inter alia that Mexico had violated Article XVII of the General
6
Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”); Article 5.1 and 5.2
7
of the GATS Annex on Telecommunications; and Sections 1.1
and 2.2 of the GATS Telecommunications Reference Paper
8
(“Reference Paper”). In the Telmex Report the panel (“Telmex
Panel”) found that Mexico had indeed breached several of these
9
commitments, marking the first time that the WTO dispute
resolution bodies were called upon to resolve a pure services
dispute, the first dispute involving the Reference Paper, and
the first dispute in which a panel applied WTO anti10
competition rules.
6. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Art. XVII, 1869
U.N.T.S. 183 (1994) [hereinafter GATS] (requiring Members to “accord to services
and service suppliers of any other Member . . . treatment no less favourable than
that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers,” which is typically
referred to as a “national treatment” obligation).
7. Id. at Annex on Telecommunications Art. 5.1 (requiring Members to
“ensure that any service supplier of any other Member is accorded access to and
use of public telecommunications transport networks and services on reasonable
and non-discriminatory terms and conditions”). Id. at Annex on
Telecommunications Art. 5.2 (requiring Members to “ensure that service suppliers
of any other Member have access to and use of any public telecommunications
transport network or service offered within or across the border of that Member,
including private leased circuits”).
8. Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper states that “[a]ppropriate measures
shall be maintained for the purpose of preventing suppliers who, alone or together,
are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive practices.”
Section 2.2 of the Reference Paper states that “[i]nterconnection with a major
supplier will be ensured at any technically feasible point in the network.” Reference
Paper, GATS Negotiating group on basic telecommunications para. 2.1 (Apr. 24
1996), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/tel23_e.ht
m.
9. See Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.216 (finding that Mexico has
failed to fulfill its commitment to providing interconnection at cost oriented rates
under TRP §2.2); id. at para. 7.269 (finding that Mexico had failed to fulfill its
commitment to prevent anti-competitive practices under TRP §1.1); id. at para.
7.335 (finding that Mexico had failed to fulfill its commitment to ensure that U.S.
service suppliers were granted access to public telecommunications in Mexico on
reasonable terms under GATT Telecommunications Annex 5(a)); id. at paras. 7.381,
7.385, 7.389 (finding that Mexico’s failure to grant access to private leased circuits
and the Mexican telecommunications regulation regime were inconsistent with
GATS Telecommunications Annex 5(b)).
10. See William J. Davey, Specificities of WTO dispute settlement in services
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On a policy level, commentators have framed the Telmex
Panel’s approach as reflecting a choice between two conceptions
of the nature of the rules embodied in the WTO Telecoms
11
Agreement. On one view, the disciplines in the WTO Telecoms
Agreement created obligations only with regard to regulations
actually promulgated by a government. On the competing view,
the WTO Telecoms Agreement required WTO Members
(“Members”) to remedy the anticompetitive practices of private
12
actors. The Telmex Report resolved this debate in favor of the
latter view. In the following analysis, however, this article
highlights an antecedent legal determination. Namely, in order
for the Telmex Panel to find itself in a position to make this
critical policy choice, it first had to find that the dispute fell
within the scope of the WTO Telecoms Agreement. This
required the Telmex Panel to resolve threshold issues of first
impression regarding the concepts of interconnection,
accounting rates and the mode of supply of basic
telecommunications services. The Telmex Panel’s treatment of
these legal issues has been criticized by many commentators,
including the leading WTO treatise which has labeled the
panel’s conclusion with regard to mode of supply as “an
13
untenable outcome.” With the benefit of the constitutional
cases, in GATS AND THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES 276,
289 (Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl & Pierre Sauvé eds., 2008); Andrew W. Shoyer,
Lessons learned from litigating GATS disputes: Mexico—Telecoms, in GATS AND
THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES 225, 226 (Marion
Panizzon, Nicole Pohl & Pierre Sauvé eds., 2008); Shin-yi Peng, Trade in
Telecommunications Services: Doha and Beyond, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 293, 313
(2007); Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economic
Research, Mexico—Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, WTO NEWS
11 (July 2004), http://www.unisg.ch/org/siaw/web.nsf/SysWebRessources/wtonews1
1etxt/$FILE/wtonews11e.txt.
11. The WTO Telecoms Agreement is a term used to refer to the specialized
regime which governs a WTO member’s commitments in the telecommunications
sector. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 3 at 678. See infra note 71 and
accompanying text.
12. See Eleanor M. Fox, The WTO’s First Antitrust Case—Mexican Telecom: A
Sleeping Victory for Trade and Competition, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 271, 272–73 (2006).
13. See, e.g., MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 311, at 687; MICHAEL J.
TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 394 (3d
ed. 2005); Eric H. Leroux, From Periodicals to Gambling: A review of systemic issues
addressed by WTO adjudicatory bodies under the GATS, in GATS AND THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES 236, 257–58 (Marion Panizzon,
Nicole Pohl & Pierre Sauvé eds., 2008); Chan-Mo Chung, Interpretation of
“Interconnection” by the WTO Mexico-Telecommunications Panel: A Critique, 41 J.
WORLD TRADE 783 (2007); Damien J. Neven & Petros C. Mavroidis, Mexico—
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discourse that has blossomed in the years following the report,
however, this article argues that the apparent inconsistencies
within the Telmex Report can best be understood as the product
of a particular vision of the WTO as a constitutional order
established to safeguard the rights of individuals within the
multilateral trading system. Viewed through the lens of this
rights-based constitutional theory, the otherwise irreconcilable
14
positions adopted by the Telmex Report become intelligible.
This article assesses the extent to which an individual
emanation of WTO jurisprudence could be said to reflect a
certain constitutional vision of the WTO. Even with this caveat,
however, it is undeniable that the discourse of
constitutionalization can create a sort of feedback loop serving
to further entrench the notion of the WTO as a constitutional
15
organization. Observations regarding a given institution’s
“constitution” are themselves internalized, whether contested
or embraced, in subsequent constitutional discourse such that
the simple act of framing a question in constitutional terms can
serve to reify the object of study. The aim of this article is to
inquire into the extent to which a particular type of
constitutionalism has already begun to manifest itself within
the GATS and what effects this may be expected to have. Part I
introduces the concept of rights-based constitutionalism with a
particular emphasis on its application to the world trading
regime. Part II sets forth the facts and law at issue in the
Telmex Report. This Part aims to show the state of play that
existed in the international telecommunications field prior to
the Telmex Report. Part III examines the outcome of the Telmex
Report and demonstrates that at least part of its most
Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services (WT/DS204/R) A Comment on
“El mess in TELMEX”, in THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2003 188 (Henrik Horn & Petros
C. Mavroidis eds., 2006); J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, Überregulation without
Economics: The World Trade Organization’s Decision in the U.S.-Mexico Arbitration
on Telecommunications Services, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 1 (2004); Philip Marsden,
WTO decides its first competition case, with disappointing results, COMPETITION
LAW INSIGHT, May 2004, at 3.
14. See Chios Carmody, A Theory of WTO Law, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 511, 556
(2008).
15. See Neil Walker, The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key, in
THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 31, 38–39 (Gráinne de
Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2001); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The
WTO’s ‘Constitution’ and the Discipline of International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L.
647, 668 (2006); Andrew Lang, Book Review, Deborah Cass, The
Constitutionalization of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 309 (2006).
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controversial
legal
determinations
are
capable
of
comprehension as a product of rights-based constitutional
theory. Part IV concludes by providing an assessment of the
potential impact that Telmex-style constitutionalization could
have on the WTO, both with regard to the jurisprudence of the
WTO and its legitimacy.
I. RIGHTS-BASED CONSTITUTIONALISM
16

The term “constitutional” has many different meanings.
For the rights-based constitutionalist, and hence for purposes
of the analysis contained in this article, constitutionalism is
considered to be an amalgam of liberal democratic principles,
such as the rule of law and separation of powers, that have
developed over centuries of experimentation so as to protect the
17
rights of individual citizens. These principles apply to
16. See e.g., CASS, supra note 4; Richard Collins, Constitutionalism as LiberalJuridical Consciousness: Echoes from International Law’s Past, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L
L. 251, 253 (2009); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Multilevel Trade Governance in the
WTO Requires Multilevel Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL
TRADE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL REGULATION 5, 34 (Christian Joerges & ErnstUlrich Petersmann eds., 2006); Anne Peters, Compensatory Constitutionalism: The
Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures, 19
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 579, 581 (2006); Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the
WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 623 (2006); Bardo Fassbender, The Meaning of
International Constitutional Law, in TOWARDS WORLD CONSTITUTIONALISM: ISSUES
IN THE LEGAL ORDERING OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY 837, 839–40 (Ronald St. John
Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnson eds., 2005); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, L’unité de
l’ordre juridique international, 297 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 227 (2002); Peter
Holmes, The WTO and the EU: Some Constitutional Comparisons, in THE EU AND
THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 59, 60 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne
Scott eds., 2001) (noting that economists “have a tradition of using the terms
‘constitution’ and ‘constitutionalisation’ to cover almost any arrangement that
precommits economic policy to a fixed set of rules”); Howse and Nicolaïdis, supra
note 4, at 235–36; Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in
International Law, 250 RECUEIL DES COURS 216, 258–62 (1994).
17. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, European and International Constitutional
Law: Time for Promoting “Cosmopolitan Democracy” in the WTO, in THE EU AND
THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 81, 97 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne
Scott eds., 2001) [hereinafter Petersmann, European and International
Constitutional Law”] (listing the “constitutional principles of freedom and nondiscrimination”);Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International
Economic Law in the 21st Century: The Need to Clarify Their Interrelationships, 4
J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 11–16 (2001) [hereinafter Petersmann, Human Rights and
International Economic Law] (listing “cosmopolitan constitutional law”,
“international constitutionalism”, and “national constitutionalism” among the eight
core principles of constitutionalism which open the theory to a sort of endogeneity
bias); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in International Economic
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constitutionalized institutions of all varieties with different
implications in each instance. Thus, the doctrine of separation
of powers may be applied to a State or an international
organization, perhaps with divergent institutional and policy
prescriptions, although both the State and the international
organization will be considered to have adopted constitutional
systems to the extent that the principles are deployed to limit
18
governmental powers so as to increase individual freedom.
Within the world trading system, however, for the rightsbased
constitutionalist
the
relevant
constitutional
considerations are brought into sharper focus. Institutions
within the world trading system have a definite role to play in
providing the proper conditions within which market
19
transactions can flourish. In this context, the “basic objective”
of constitutionalism is “constituting and limiting government
Law—Lessons for Strengthening International Dispute Settlement in Non-economic
Areas, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 189, 244 (1999) [hereinafter Petersmann, Dispute
Settlement] (listing “freedom, non-discrimination, fair procedures and rule of law”
as “constitutional guarantees”); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law
and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System 1948–1996: An Introduction, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 3,
11–19 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Petersmann, International
Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System] (listing the
“constitutional values of freedom and non-discrimination”); Petersmann,
Constitutionalism and International Organizations, 17 N.W. J. INT’L L & BUS. 398,
425–26 (1996–97) [hereinafter Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International
Organizations] (listing “freedom, non-discrimination, rule of law, separation of
powers and other fundamental rights”); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Limited
Government and Unlimited Trade Policy Powers? Why Effective Judicial Review of
Foreign Trade Restrictions Depends on Individual Rights, in NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 537, 538–40 (Meinhard Hilf &
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993) (listing the supremacy of individual rights
over state power and the need to protect “equality before the law” as necessary
premises to consider when discussing international economic law).
18. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Judging Judges: From ‘Principal-Agent Theory’
to ‘Constitutional Justice’ in Multilevel ‘Judicial Governance’ of Economic
Cooperation Among Citizens, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L 827, 844 (2008) [hereinafter
Petersmann, Judging Judges].
19. This idea is best expressed in the quote “in the absence of a world
government, ‘public goods’ like non-discriminatory access to foreign markets and
supplies, monetary stability and international legal certainty can be produced only
through liberal international rules with ‘constitutional functions’.” ERNST-ULRICH
PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIMC LAW XL (1991) [hereinafter PETERSMANN,
CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS]. See also Petersmann, Constitutionalism and
International Organizations, supra note 17, at 406 (listing “individual liberties and
actionable property rights” as preconditions for the proper functioning of economic
markets).
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powers for the protection of equal rights of citizens by means of
20
constitutional rules of a higher legal rank.” Parsing of this
basic objective reveals that the theory relies upon three
premises whose full realization within the world trading
system would require significant adaptation of the dominant
legal and institutional conceptions of the WTO. First, the
theory presupposes that individuals possess rights (“equal
rights of citizens”) that are cognizable within the law of the
WTO. Second, the theory posits the existence of broad
“constitutional rules” that are of a “higher legal rank” than
other non-constitutional rules within the world trading regime.
Third, in order for these constitutional rules to serve their
appointed function of protecting individual rights, rights-based
constitutionalism envisages certain modalities by which the
constitutional rules should be deployed by the judiciary so as to
limit government’s ability (“limiting government powers”) to
interfere with individual rights.
Under a rights-based constitutional theory, the
justification for this tripartite transformation of the world
trading system is that the WTO Agreement was itself a

20. Petersmann, supra note 16, at 6; see also Petersmann, Constitutionalism
and International Organizations, supra note 17, at 405, 445–46 (listing “dignity,
liberty” and “legal equality” as basic rights); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human
Rights, Markets and Economic Welfare: Constitutional Functions of the Emerging
UN Human Rights Constitution, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29,
39 (Frederick M. Abbott, Christine Breining-Kaufman & Thomas Cottier eds.,
2006) [hereinafter Petersmann, Human Rights, Markets and Economic Welfare]
(listing “freedom of choice, political competition and equal individual rights” as
rights of citizens); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, National Constitutions and
International Economic Law, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW 3, 5 (Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993)
[hereinafter Petersmann, National Constitutions] (listing “equal treatment,
equality, due process and fairness” as outcomes of these long-term considerations).
This definition broadly coheres with the “core” of international constitutionalism
identified by Klabbers, namely “placing limits on the activities of international
organizations, subjecting those organizations to standards of proper behavior.” Jan
Klabbers, Constitutionalism Lite, 1 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 31, 32 (2004). See also BrunOtto Bryde, International Democratic Constitutionalism, in TOWARDS WORLD
CONSTITUTIONALISM: ISSUES IN THE LEGAL ORDERING OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY
103, 106 (Ronald St. John Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnson eds., 2005). The
“proper behavior” in this case would be respect for the rules of a higher legal rank.
Note that the government powers to be limited by constitutional rules include those
exercised by international organizations. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights
and the Law of the World Trade Organization, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 241, 249 (2003)
[hereinafter Petersmann, Human Rights and the Law of the WTO].
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constitutional moment. By consenting to the WTO Agreement
the WTO Members effectively “‘constitutionalize[d]’ the world
trading system in response to the new challenges of the
21
globalization of the world economy and of civil society.” This
can be problematic when attempting to apply rights-based
theory to the reality of the modern trade law regime since the
WTO and its Members do not view the institution through this
22
constitutional lens. As a result, much of the rights-based
constitutionalist literature advocates for changes to bring the
WTO into conformity with the three conditions listed above,
which themselves are often presented as either self-evident or
faits accomplis. The distinction between advocacy and
identification, between prescription and depiction, which is
23
customarily blurred in constitutional rhetoric, is at times
completely obscured in rights-based constitutional discourse
24
regarding the WTO. The following three sub-parts summarize
the critically transformative trinity of concepts within rightsbased constitutional theory as applied to the world trading
regime, namely that individuals possess constitutional rights,
that these rights consists of broad economic freedoms, and that
judges have a special role to play in protecting individual
economic rights.
A. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL PLANE
It is immediately apparent that if a legal system whose
25
basic objective is to secure the “equal rights of citizens” is to
achieve its aim, then citizens or individuals under this regime
must themselves possess rights. As a practical matter, if
individuals did not possess rights, or if public authorities were

21. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Constitutionalize International Law
and Foreign Policy for the Benefit of Civil Society?, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 19 (1998).
22. Carmody, supra note 14, at 539; Joel P. Trachtman and Philip M.
Moremen, Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement:
Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 229 (2003).
23. Collins, supra note 16, at 264.
24. See CASS, supra note 4, at 152–53. Cass presents the possibility that this
ambiguity is consciously executed so as to expand the scope of debate relating to
the WTO. Id. at 161–62. In this regard, rights-based constitutional theory follows
in the tradition of what Koskenniemi has identified as “idealism” in international
law. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 209–18 (2005).
25. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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not vested with the power to vindicate those rights, the
enterprise
of
securing
individual
rights
through
constitutionalization would be stillborn. Thus, the classic model
of public international law where, absent express provisions to
the contrary, only States possess the right to bring claims for
26
violations of treaties on an international plane, presents an
inhospitable
terrain
for
a
theory
of
rights-based
constitutionalization to take root. The WTO is in many ways
27
innovative from the perspective of public international law,
but not as regards piercing the State veil and endowing citizens
with rights. With the exception of intellectual property rights,
the rights and obligations created and disputed within the
28
WTO are those of States, not individual citizens.
This state of affairs is sub-optimal for the rights-based
constitutional theorist whose Kantian grounding places the
interests and rights of individual citizens at the epicenter of the
29
legal universe. This human rights revolution in international
law requires “a citizen-oriented national and international
constitutional framework different from the power-oriented,
30
state-centred conceptions of traditional international law.” It
is not surprising then that according to rights-based theory the
substantive rights within the WTO have as “their ultimate
26. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 197 (6th ed., 2008).
27. In particular the WTO’s introduction of compulsory dispute resolution,
adoption of decisions by negative consensus, and the idea that adjudicatory bodies
may suggest methods of compliance to Members found to be in violation of their
WTO commitments may all be considered innovative from the perspective of public
international law.
28. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of
1974, para. 7.72, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999).
29. See Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations,
supra note 17, at 422–26; Petersmann, Human Rights, Markets and Economic
Welfare, supra note 20, at 31; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Taking Human Dignity,
Poverty and Empowerment of Individuals More Seriously: Rejoinder to Alston, 13
EUR. J. INT’L L. 845, 850 (2002) [hereinafter Petersmann, Rejoinder to Alston];
Petersmann, supra note 21, at 7–11. On the nature of Petersmann’s claim to
grounding in Kantian thought see Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and
Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann, 13 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 815, 837–41 (2002).
30. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’
for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons
from European Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 621, 649 (2002); Peters, supra note
16, at 597 (stating that a classic theme of constitutionalism is seeking “to contain
political power in order to safeguard the autonomy of the individual”); Christian
Tomuschat, International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a
New Century, 281 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 161–62 (1999).
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31

function to protect the rights of private citizens.” This citizenoriented purpose of the WTO’s rules, combined with the
inherent nature of economic law as concerning individual
action, militates in favor of a reallocation of procedural as well
32
as substantive rights. Because international economic law “is
an instrument for empowering and protecting mutually
beneficial cooperation among citizens across frontiers, judges
33
should . . . recogniz[e] citizens as legal subjects.”
The
argument proceeds from observation to advocacy; because
individual citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of WTO laws,
individual citizens should be capable of vindicating their
interest in these laws.
For the rights-based constitutionalist, the WTO’s ability to
protect individuals is frustrated by producer-capture; the
overriding emphasis on producer concerns at the WTO operates
“to the detriment of the general citizen interest in maximizing
34
consumer welfare through liberal trade.” Bypassing the
producer interests so as to address individual rights at the
WTO level “serves broader constitutional functions for
empowering individuals as legal subjects (‘market citizens’)
rather than mere objects of integration, notably for protecting
their personal self-development and equal basic rights against
35
welfare-reducing government limitations.” The emphasis on
31. Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, supra
note 17, at 453. See also Petersmann, Dispute Settlement, supra note 17, at 211.
32. Petersmann, Dispute Settlement, supra note 17, at 225.
33. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law
and ‘Constitutional Justice’, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 769, 773 (2008) [hereinafter
Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and ‘Constitutional
Justice’]. See also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights in European and
Global Integration Law: Principles for Constitutionalizing the World Economy, in
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION: STUDIES IN
TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN HONOUR OF CLAUS-DIETER EHLERMANN 383,
401–02 (Armin von Bogdandy, Petros C. Mavroidis & Yves Mèny eds., 2002)
[hereinafter Petersmann, Human Rights in European and Global Integration Law].
34. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and Human Rights, 3 J.
INT’L. ECON. L. 19, 22 (2000) [hereinafter Petersmann, The WTO Constitution]. See
also Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and ‘Constitutional
Justice’, supra note 33, at 797 (2008) (noting a “often one-sided focus” on
governmental and producer interests); Petersmann, Human Rights and
International Economic Law, supra note 17, at 27.
35. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The ‘Human Rights Approach’ Advocated by the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and by the International Labour
Organization: Is it Relevant for WTO Law and Policy?, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 605, 621
(2004) [hereinafter Petersmann, The ‘Human Rights Approach’]. See also
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increasing market freedoms has exposed advocates of rightsbased constitutionalization to accusations of harboring a desire
36
to Lochnerize WTO law. The blindness of rights-based
theories to the dangers of Lochner era jurisprudence is
evidenced by a tendency within the theory not to question the
potential adverse effects of universal robust privileging of
37
individual economic freedoms.
Rights-based constitutional theory complements principled
arguments in favor of vesting WTO rights in individual citizens
with consequentialist justifications rooted in the WTO’s
38
legitimacy and efficacy.
With regard to the former
justification, the promotion of “citizen-oriented” economic
freedoms is seen as increasing the legitimacy of international
39
tribunals to engage in judicial review of State actions. The
argument with regard to efficacy works on at least two levels.
At the horizontal level among States, it is argued that citizen
enforcement of international law is a more effective means of
40
ensuring peaceful resolution of international disputes. At the
vertical level, concerning the relations between a State and its
own citizens, bestowing rights and the ability to enforce them
upon citizens is seen as the most effective way of providing
41
maximum freedom to all. Accordingly, under the rights-based
constitutional theory the structure of rights and obligations at
the WTO should be rearranged. As a normative project “the
citizens must become the main subjects and beneficiaries of
Petersmann, European and International Constitutional Law, supra note 17, at
107.
36. Howse, supra note 1, at 946. In Lochner v. New York, the U.S. Supreme
Court invalidated regulations regarding the maximum number of hours a baker
could work based upon the idea that such regulations violated the bakers’ freedom
to contract. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). According to one scholar,
Lochner symbolizes “not merely an aggressive judicial role, but an approach that
imposes a constitutional requirement of neutrality, and understands the term to
refer to preservation of the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements under
the baseline of the common law.” Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 873, 875 (1987).
37. Petersmann, National Constitutions, supra note 20, at 14.
38. See CASS, supra note 4, at 162–63.
39. See Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and
‘Constitutional Justice’, supra note 33, at 794.
40. See Petersmann, supra note 21, at 21; Petersmann, Dispute Settlement,
supra note 17, at 238.
41. See Petersmann, National Constitutions, supra note 20, at 26; see also
Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, supra note 17, at
424.
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42

WTO rules.” On this view the WTO is, or should become, “as
43
much vertical as horizontal.”
1. Constitutional rules
Having re-oriented the WTO bargain away from State and
producer interests and vested citizens with the ability to invoke
their individual economic rights within the multilateral trading
system, the question for the rights-based constitutionalist then
becomes one of identifying the constitutional rules that
constrain the policy options available to governments so as to
protect these individual rights. Rights-based constitutionalists
maintain that there exists a WTO “constitution” that is
superior to the Agreements listed in the Annexes to the WTO
Agreement
(“Annexes”)
and
various
schedules
of
44
commitments. It is not clear, however, of what exactly this
45
“constitution” consists. To the extent that the “constitution”
consists solely of the WTO Agreement itself the proposition is
non-controversial because Article XVI:3 states that the WTO
Agreement will prevail over other documents in the event of a
conflict. Nevertheless, the technical nature of the WTO
Agreement does not lend itself to performing a constitutional
function in the sense of protecting individual rights against
46
government encroachment. In addition, it is difficult if not
impossible to identify rules in the WTO Agreement which would
be of a higher legal rank in this sense vis-à-vis the Annexes.
This is because the articles of the WTO Agreement address
entirely unrelated matters, such as the administration and
legal personality of the WTO itself. The preamble to the WTO
42. Petersmann, The WTO Constitution, supra note 34, at 24. See also
Petersmann, Human Rights, Markets and Economic Welfare, supra note 20, at 33.
43. Steve Charnovitz, Comment, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY AND LEGITIMACY: THE
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 253, 253 (Roger B. Porter et
al. eds., 2001).
44. See, e.g., Petersmann, Human Rights and International Economic Law,
supra note 17, at 24–25.
45. It is apparent, however, that the term constitution as used in this context
is not to be equated with the normal sense in which the term is used in reference to
international organizations to refer to “the legal framework within which an
autonomous community of a functional (sectoral) nature realizes its respective
functional goal . . . .” Erika de Wet, The International Constitutional Order, 55
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 51, 53 (2006).
46. See JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 107
(2005).
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Agreement refers to certain goals such as full employment,
sustainable development and environmental protection, but to
say that these represent rules with which the substantive
obligations under WTO law must cohere strains the
interpretive weight that can properly be assigned to the
47
preamble.
In fact, the constitutional rules advanced by rights-based
theorists derive more from general principles than from any
specific text to which the WTO members have agreed. Under a
rights-based constitutional theory, the basic characteristic of a
48
constitutional rule is that it is “universalisable.” These
49
universalizable rules are avowedly “general and abstract.” In
the case of the WTO, the universalizable rules to be fixed in the
constitutional firmament are “worldwide guarantees of
50
economic freedom” with “maximum equal liberty as the ‘first
51
principle of justice.’” In this sense, economic freedoms such as
those permitting cross-border trade in goods and services are
recast as rules with “constitutional functions” because these
rules constrain the ability of governments to act in certain
52
ways inimical to individual rights. Such rules derive their
47. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(2), 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (1969) [hereinafter VCLT]. The preamble to the VCLT itself affirms that
disputes “should be settled . . . in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law.” Id. at Pmbl. Petersmann has argued that this text “requires
judges to review their traditionally state-centered conceptions of public
international law, for example by judicial ‘balancing’ among competing principles,
rights and other rules of law.” Petersmann, Judging Judges, supra note 18, at 838.
48. Petersmann, Multilevel Trade Governance, supra note 16, at 16.
49. Id. at 15.
50. Petersmann, International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute
Settlement System, supra note 17, at 23. See also Petersmann, Dispute Settlement,
supra note 17, at 211–12; Petersmann, European and International Constitutional
Law, supra note 17, at 102. But see Robert Howse, Human Rights in the WTO:
Whose Rights, What Humanity? Comment on Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 651
(2002) (critiquing the indeterminacy of these freedoms).
51. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Challenges to the Legitimacy and Efficiency of
the World Trading System: Democratic Governance and Competition Culture in the
WTO, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 585, 587 (2004).
52. See Petersmann, National Constitutions, supra note 20, at 47–48. See also
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Addressing Institutional Challenges to the WTO in the
New Millennium: A Longer-Term Perspective, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 647, 663 (2005)
[hereinafter Petersmann, Addressing Institutional Challenges]; Petersmann,
Constitutionalism and International Organizations, supra note 17, at 439;
Petersmann, The ‘Human Rights Approach’, supra note 35, at 616; Petersmann,
Human Rights and International Economic Law, supra note 17, at 14; Petersmann,
Judging Judges, supra note 18, at 845; Petersmann, supra note 30, at 649. See
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legitimacy in part from the “universally recognized insight that
liberal trade and non-discriminatory competition tend to
53
maximize consumer welfare.” Note, however, that these rules
can perform their constitutional functions only when construed
54
as rights of citizens, not States. Hence, according to the
rights-based constitutional theory, the maximization of the
liberty and economic freedom of the individual trader or
consumer should become the universalizable constitutional rule
animating the WTO.
2. Protecting constitutional rights and the role of the judiciary
The previous sub-parts examined two fundamental
components of the rights-based constitutional conception of the
WTO. First, in order to protect the equal rights of citizens in
the world trading system, citizens must become direct subjects
of these rights. Second, the constitutional rules that the WTO
should apply to discipline States consist of broad economic
freedoms vested in individual citizens. The final aspect of the
rights-based constitutionalist theory is the institutional
methodology by which the WTO should deploy these
constitutional rules so as to restrict the ability of governments
to interfere with individuals’ enjoyment of their rights.
Consistent with the theory’s Kantian orientation, the
methodology by which the constitutional freedoms are
55
vindicated focuses on the role of judges.
According to the rights-based constitutional theory, a
strong judiciary is implied in any constitutional conception,
since judges are presumed to be above politics and therefore
56
capable of ensuring adherence to constitutional values.
Accordingly, domestic as well as international tribunals are
57
exhorted to defend constitutional freedoms. International
generally Peters, supra note 16, at 585, 599.
53. See Petersmann, Dispute Settlement, supra note 17, at 212.
54. Petersmann, International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute
Settlement System, supra note 17, at 8.
55. See Martti Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on
Kantian Themes About International Law and Globalization, 8 THEORETICAL INQ.
L. 9, 31 (2007); Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and
‘Constitutional Justice’, supra note 33, at 773–75. See also supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
56. See Klabbers, supra note 20, at 33.
57. Petersmann has noted that judges in international tribunals must respect
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tribunals are called to act as “independent guardians of respect
for equal citizen rights by settling [international economic law]
disputes in conformity with the human rights obligations of
governments and the constitutional principles of citizen-driven
58
self-governance.” In somewhat more concrete terms, this
mandate requires judges to interpret a State’s obligations “in
conformity with their citizen-oriented treaty objectives (i.e., to
promote mutually beneficial economic cooperation among
59
citizens) . . . .”
The role of the judge is seen as both necessary and
justified. With regard to necessity, judges must assume the
mantle of implementing constitutional rules because States
cannot be relied upon to do so. The rights-based theory notes
that freedom to trade at the intra-State level “has usually been
achieved not by reliance on the benevolence of the rulers, but
rather by the struggles of courageous citizens and judges
defending
individual
freedom
against
discriminatory
60
governmental and private restrictions of trade.” Applying this
insight to the world trade regime, “there is hardly any reason
for judicial deference vis-à-vis discriminatory national
restrictions in clear violation of the WTO guarantees of freedom
61
and non-discrimination.”
the institutional limits of their mandate. Petersmann, supra note 16, at 39.
Interestingly, in this same passage he offers the Telmex Report as an example of
how WTO rules can directly impact the discretion of national legislatures even
though, strictly speaking, WTO rules do not produce direct effect within a given
national legal system.
58. Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and
‘Constitutional Justice’, supra note 33, at 798. Note that, whereas typically norm
entrepreneurs in the human rights area emerge from the coordinated civil societies
of several countries, the right to trade advocacy proceeds from a multinational to a
national stage. See generally Steve Peers, Fundamental Right or Political Whim?
WTO Law and the European Court of Justice, in THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 111, 129–30 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds.,
2001).
59. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, Constitutionalism and ‘Public
Reason’ in Investor-State Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE
21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 877, 890 (Christina
Binder et al. eds., 2009).
60. Petersmann, Human Rights and International Economic Law, supra note
17, at 31; see also Petersmann, Human Rights, Markets and Economic Welfare,
supra note 20, at 52; Petersmann, Human Rights in European and Global
Integration Law, supra note 33, at 391; Petersmann, supra note 30, at 636;
Petersmann, European and International Constitutional Law, supra note 17, at
105.
61. Petersmann, Human Rights and International Economic Law, supra note
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The justification for positioning judges at the van of the
rights-based revolution is set forth in legal as well as
institutional terms. The fact that individuals increasingly bear
rights under international law is cast as a factor militating in
favor of a “reformative interpretation” of international
economic law to protect individual rights where previously this
62
was not the case. At the institutional level, the argument
proceeds from the assertion that all international regimes
ultimately derive their legitimacy from their ability to protect
basic human rights. Because economic freedoms perform
63
“human rights functions,”
the interpretation of treaty
obligations so as to expand economic freedoms increases respect
64
for human rights and the legitimacy of the institution as well.
To the extent that the role of States in this process of
judicial constitutionalization is taken into account, their
consent to constitutionalization is considered as implicitly
given by the nature of their commitments at the WTO. A
consequence of viewing the adoption of the WTO Agreement as
65
a constitutional moment
is that “self-imposed liberal
international economic obligations can . . . serve ‘constitutional
functions’ for a more liberal interpretation, application and
agreed extension to foreign trade of the corresponding
constitutional principles of democratic societies such as . . .
66
non-discriminatory market access . . . .” Pursuant to their
constitutional mission, judges may even be justified in
67
discarding the principle of pacta sunt servanda, at least where
its application to substantive obligations fails to protect human
17, at 32.
62. See Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and
‘Constitutional Justice’, supra note 33, at 772–73; see also Tomuschat, supra note
30, at 161–62 (describing the general transition from a State-centered to an
individual-centered system); supra note 26 and accompanying text.
63. See Petersmann, Human Rights and the Law of the WTO, supra note 20, at
268–69; see also John O. McGinnis, A New Agenda for International Human Rights:
Economic Freedoms, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1029, 1032–34 (1999); Petersmann, supra
note 30, at 643–44; Petersmann, European and International Constitutional Law,
supra note 17, at 92; Petersmann, The ‘Human Rights Approach’, supra note 35, at
616; Petersmann, Rejoinder to Alston, supra note 29, at 847.
64. See Petersmann, Judging Judges, supra note 18, 879–82.
65. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
66. PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS, supra note 19, at XLI.
67. See generally VCLT, supra note 47, at art. 26 (defining pacta sunt
servanda as “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith”).
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68

rights. The overall effect of the rights-based constitutional
theory is to provide judges with a platform for transforming the
Dispute Settlement System into a sort of Trojan Horse of
economic liberalization whereby judges use their constitutional
authority
to
aggressively broaden
Members’ initial
69
liberalization commitments through interpretation.
II. LAW AND FACTS IN THE TELMEX REPORT
The previous section summarized the principal tenets of
rights-based constitutional theory as relates to the WTO.
Before evaluating the Telmex Report qua rights-based
constitutional document, however, it is necessary to understand
the law and facts in play in that particular case. With regard to
the law, in order to determine the commitments undertaken by
a Member in the telecommunications sector a practitioner must
look to the four components of the WTO Telecoms Agreement:
the GATS itself, the Annex on Telecommunications, the
70
Member’s Reference Paper, and the Member’s schedule of
71
specific commitments. With the exception of the GATS, these
documents concern themselves principally with technical and
industry standards. Despite their relatively narrow focus,
however, the meaning of key technical provisions of the WTO
Telecoms Agreement remained contested even after the
72
Agreement entered into force. For purposes of this article,
issues relating to the scope of the commitments that Members
had made, as well as the terms “accounting rate” and
“interconnection,” will be of particular importance. In order to
68. Petersmann, Dispute Settlement, supra note 17, at 244.
69. See Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy—and Back Again: The
Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 94, 97–98 (2002); Jeffrey
L. Dunoff, The Death of the Trade Regime, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 733, 738–739 (1999).
70. See supra note 8.
71. See MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 3, at 678; David Luff,
Telecommunications and Audio-visual Services: Considerations for a Convergence
Policy at the World Trade Organization Level, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 1059, 1061
(2006); Jingxia Shi, Telecommunications Services in China: Implications of WTO
Membership, 5 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 579, 582 (2004); see also GATS art.
XX; Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting, para. 160, WT/DS285/AB/R (April 7, 2005).
72. See Peter F. Cowhey, Accounting Rates, Cross-Border Services and the
Next WTO Round on Basic Telecommunications Services, in THE WTO AND GLOBAL
CONVERGENCE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND AUDIO-VISUAL SERVICES 51, 51
(Damien Geradin & David Luff eds., 2004).
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understand the role of constitutional values in shaping the
Telmex Panel’s report it is necessary to understand the
contemporaneous state of debate regarding the issues. The
following sub-parts, therefore, present brief overviews of
international trade law relating to accounting rates,
interconnection, and modes of supply prior to the Telmex
Report, as well as the underlying factual scenario of the
dispute.
A. INTERCONNECTION AND MODES OF SUPPLY
Interconnection is one of the most important concepts within
73
the Reference Paper, if not within modern telecommunications
74
policy generally. The Reference Paper defines interconnection
as “linking with suppliers providing public telecommunications
transport networks or services in order to allow the users of one
supplier to communicate with users of another supplier and to
75
access services provided by another supplier.” The Reference
Paper requires that interconnection be provided at “cost-oriented
rates” and “under non-discriminatory terms,” among other
76
conditions.
Prior to the Telmex Panel’s finding that the term
“interconnection” embraced international as well as domestic
interconnection, evidence suggests that the term was primarily
understood within the telecommunications industry to apply
77
only to the domestic variant. In other words, the Reference
Paper’s disciplines regarding interconnection applied to
telecommunications suppliers of any nationality competing in
the same domestic market, but Reference Paper imposed no
obligations with regard to the terms of interconnection offered to
73. Marco C.E.J. Bronckers & Pierre LaRouche, Telecommunications Services
and the World Trade Organization, 31 J. WORLD TRADE, June 1997 at 5, 28; see also
Shi, supra note 71, at 598; MARK NAFTEL & LAWRENCE J. SPIWAK, THE TELECOMS
TRADE WAR: THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANISATION 110 (2000); Chantal Blouin, The WTO Agreement on Basic
Telecommunications: A Reevaluation, 24 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 135, 137
(2000).
74. See William H. Melody, Interconnection: Cornerstone of Competition, in
TELECOM REFORM: PRINCIPLES POLICIES AND REGULATORY PRACTICES 53, 53
(William H. Melody ed., 1997).
75. Reference Paper, supra note 8, at para. 2.1.
76. Id. at para. 2.2(a).
77. Chung, supra note 13, at n.30.
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78

incoming international signals. The close resemblance between
the definition of interconnection contained in the Reference
Paper and the definition commonly used to refer to domestic
interconnection in both the United States and the European
79
Union supports this view.
This restrictive view of
interconnection, moreover, is consistent with the pre-Telmex
Report literature which indicated that the Reference Paper’s
disciplines regarding interconnection were designed to aid
foreign entrants attempting to establish a physical presence in
80
domestic telecommunications markets. At least one country,
however—Australia—took a broader view of the term, stating
that points of interconnection for purposes of the Reference
Paper could occur at “the international exchange, the trunk
exchange, the local exchange, a radiocommunications base
station, or any other point that may or may not be within
81
national borders.”
Assuming that the term interconnection is capable of
embracing the domestic as well as international variants, the
conditions of international connection would be subject to the
Reference Paper disciplines only if the Member in question has
made a commitment to apply the Reference Paper to
telecommunications services being provided via a particular
mode of supply. The GATS provides for four so called “modes of
supply” which are typically referred to by number. Mode I
supply encompasses “cross-border supply” of services where the
service supplier and consumer remain in their respective
82
distinct Member countries and the service crosses the border.
78. Id. at 789–90.
79. Bronckers & LaRouche, supra note 73, at 28; cf. Jeffrey H. Rohlfs & J.
Gregory Sidak, Exporting Telecommunications Regulation: The United StatesJapan
Negotiations on Interconnection Pricing, 43 HARV. J. INT’L L. 317, 327–28 (2002)
(noting the strong similarities between the Reference Paper and American
regulatory policies embodied in the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
80. See, e.g., Blouin, supra note 73, at 137–38; Markus Fredebeul-Krein &
Andreas Freytag, The Case for a More Binding WTO Agreement on Regulatory
Principles in Telecommunications Markets, 23 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 625,
629 (1999).
81. Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Communication from
Australia: Interconnection, para. 12, S/C/W/110/Add.9 (June 24, 1999). See
generally id. at para. 13 (“A carrier which either owns or controls
telecommunications facilities should be required to permit, on request, the
interconnection of those facilities with an international carrier seeking access to
those facilities, on the same terms as permitted to a national carrier.”).
82. GATS Art. 1.2(a).
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Mode II supply encompasses “consumption abroad” where the
service consumer travels to the country of the service supplier
83
to obtain a service. Mode III supply encompasses “commercial
presence” where a service supplier from one Member country
establishes a physical territorial presence in another Member
84
in which the service consumer is located. Mode IV supply
encompasses “presence of natural persons” where the service
supplier is a natural person who travels to the country in which
85
the service consumer is located to provide a service.
Members may commit to liberalization of service sectors
with regard to specific modes of supply. For example, a Member
could make a full commitment to the liberalization of gambling
services under mode I, but make no commitment under mode
III. This would have the effect of opening the Member’s market
to gambling services providers located on the territory of other
Members while preserving the discretion to prevent gambling
services providers from other Members from establishing
operations within its territory. Identification of which services
are at issue and under which mode of supply the services are
being provided will therefore be of critical importance in
determining whether a particular measure falls within the
scope of a Member’s WTO obligations in many GATS disputes.
International voice telephony services where the
originating carrier does not have a physical presence in the
country of termination qualify as cross-border or mode I supply.
This is because the service, not the consumer or the service
provider, crosses the border. Prior to the Telmex Report, it had
been
the
long-established
practice
within
the
telecommunications industry and telecommunications trade
law
that
the
terminating
carrier,
that
is
the
telecommunications provider in the country into which the call
has been placed, was considered to have exported a service (the
service of termination) that the originating carrier was
considered to have imported into the country from which the
call was placed. As some commentators have observed:
[A]n international call from the US to Mexico can be seen as the
bundle of two strict complements, namely a routing from the US
subscriber to the border and a termination within Mexico. The US
83. GATS Art. 1.2(b).
84. GATS Art. 1.2(c).
85. GATS Art. 1.2(d).
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operator is selling the bundle to a US subscriber and is purchasing
one element of the bundle (one input) from a Mexican operator. From
this perspective, Mexican operators are thus selling one service
(termination) to a foreign firm. In other words, they are producing a
service using domestic inputs and selling it to a foreign undertaking.
This is literally a mode I type of supply but in this perspective the
86
supplier is the Mexican operator which terminates the call . . . .

In 2000, Australia concurred with this view, stating that “the
termination of a telephone call or similar service that
87
originates in another Member is an exported service.”
Conversely, therefore, “it is the access to the network in a
foreign country which is imported” into the State in which the
88
call originates. As will be explained below in Part IV, this
traditional
conception
of
international
trade
in
telecommunication services conflicted with a rights-based,
individual-focused conception of the WTO.
1. Accounting rates
The accounting rate system is a “century-old” method of
allocating revenue between telecommunications companies
engaged in the international trade of telecommunications
89
services.
Traditionally, international telecommunications
service was provided between two national monopoly telecoms

86. Neven & Mavroidis, supra note 13, at 199–200; see also Shoyer, supra note
10, at 231; Bronckers & LaRouche, supra note 73, at 10.
87. Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Communication from
Australia: Negotiating Proposal for Telecommunication Services, para. 8,
S/CSS/W/17 (Dec. 5, 2000); see also Negotiating Group on Basic
Telecommunications, Communication from Australia: Response to Questionnaire on
Basic Telecommunications, pt. 2(A)(iii), S/NGBT/W/3/Add.14 (Oct. 21, 1994).
88. Anders Henten, Trade in Telecom-Based Services, in TELECOM REFORM:
PRINCIPLES POLICIES AND REGULATORY PRACTICES 407, 412 (William H. Melody ed.,
1997); see also ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 128 n.32
(2002) (“[S]ince the sending carrier pays the receiving carrier, in trade terms,
contrary to one’s instincts, the country or carrier terminating a call is functioning
as an exporter of a service, and the country or carrier sending the call is
functioning as an importer.”); Kenneth B. Stanley, International Settlements in a
Changing Global Telecom Market, in TELECOM REFORM: PRINCIPLES POLICIES AND
REGULATORY PRACTICES 371, 374 (William H. Melody ed., 1997); but see Boutheina
Guermazi, Reforming international accounting rates: a developing country
perspective, in THE WTO AND GLOBAL CONVERGENCE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND
AUDIO-VISUAL SERVICES 83, 99 (Damien Geradin & David Luff eds., 2004)
(“[U]nlike the traditional pattern of trade, the country which exports the call must
pay the country that imports the call for its part in terminating the service.”).
89. Guermazi, supra note 88, at 83; see also Stanley, supra note 88, at 372.
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carriers. The carrier in the country in which the call originated
would transmit the call over its facilities to the carrier in the
country where the call was to be terminated. The originating
carrier would then bill the customer who had placed the call and
pay the foreign carrier that had terminated the call for its
services. The rate at which the foreign or terminating carrier
was compensated was, and is, known as an accounting rate.
Accounting rates were not necessarily set according to market
forces, but rather were the product of opaque bilateral
90
negotiations between national monopolies.
Frustrated by the inability to push through reforms of the
accounting
rate
system
within
the
International
Telecommunications Union, the United States led the charge to
place reform of the accounting rate system on the agenda during
91
negotiations of the WTO Telecoms Agreement. An analysis of
the negotiating history, however, reveals the limitations on the
intended scope of the nascent WTO telecommunications
regulatory regime with regard to accounting rates. A February
1997 Report of the Group on Basic Telecommunications
announced an Understanding that the application of accounting
rates “would not give rise to action by Members under dispute
92
settlement under the WTO.” At the time, this Understanding
was interpreted by some as an agreement to withhold all
93
disputes regarding accounting rates. The Understanding and
the advent of the WTO Telecoms Agreement, however, provided
as much support to those who saw in the WTO Telecoms
94
Agreement the end of the accounting rate system as to those
90. Stanley, supra note 88, at 375.
91. See Bronckers & LaRouche, supra note 73, at 6–7; Richard Joseph & Peter
Drahos, Contested Arenas in International Telecommunications: Towards an
Integrated Political Perspective, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 99, 112–13 (Stuart MacDonald & Gary Madden eds., 1998).
92. Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Report of the Group on
Basic Telecommunications, para. VII S/GBT/4 (Feb. 15, 1997); see generally Special
Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Communication from Mexico:
Telecommunication Services, para. 8(ii), S/CSS/W/101, (July 10, 2001) (“Mexico
considers the ‘Understanding on Accounting Rates’ to be in force . . . .”).
93. Guermazi, supra note 88, at 85; see also Daniel Roseman, Domestic
Regulation and Trade in Telecommunications Services: Experience and Prospects
Under the GATS, in DOMESTIC REGULATION AND SERVICE TRADE LIBERALIZATION
83, 104 n.8 (Aaditya Mattoo & Pierre Sauvé eds., 2003).
94. See, e.g., NAFTEL & SPIWAK, supra note 73, at 114–15 (arguing that, among
other things, one of the general policy objectives of the WTO was to end the
international settlement-of-accounts regime); Henten, supra note 88, at 418–19

KILL. Final Read Formatted - Fixed CDL

88

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

12/10/2010 2:11 PM

[Vol 20:1

who thought the accounting rate regime would be virtually
95
unaffected.
The Understanding could be interpreted as
applying only to the most-favoured nation (“MFN”) requirement
of the GATS such that the Understanding would preclude claims
based upon accounting rate inconsistency with the MFN
discipline, but permit claims based upon accounting rate
inconsistency with any other applicable disciplines. On this view,
the Understanding reflected the fact that the accounting rates
system
under
the
International
Telecommunications
Regulations typically resulted in different Members being
charged different rates, which is to say that the accounting rates
system in the vast majority of cases constituted an ipso facto
violation of MFN. The Understanding could thus be read as a
simple clarification, in light of the fact that the normal
application of these regulations would give rise to a claim for
96
MFN violation, that Members were not to submit disputes
regarding accounting rates qua MFN violation to dispute
settlement. The WTO Secretariat, however, appeared to tip the
scales in favour of an interpretation precluding any adjudication
of disputes over accounting rates when it observed without
further qualification that “[a]n Understanding between
Members exists that no dispute on accounting rates should be
97
taken to the Dispute Settlement Body.” To the extent that this
view represented a common intention of the parties to leave
accounting rates unaffected by scheduling telecommunications
this approach should have received deference in the treaty
98
interpretation process. Nevertheless, prior to the Telmex
Report the issue remained an open question.
(arguing that a trade regime in the telecom services area will bring down the
international accounting rate system).
95. See Chung, supra note 13, at 785 (discussing the differences in reaction to
the WTO telecommunications agreements).
96. See Guermazi, supra note 88, at 100 (discussing how the international
accounting rate regime, as operating today, is in conflict with the MFN principle
under the GATS).
97. Special Session of the Council on the Negotiations, WTO (Dec. 5–6, 2000),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_wk_novdec2000_e.htm#negotiation
s.
98. Appellate Body Report, supra note 70, at paras. 159–60; see also, Appellate
Body Report, European Communities—Customs Classification of Certain Computer
Equipment, para. 109, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R (June 5,
1998) (noting that each schedule represents the tariff commitments made as part of
a common agreement among all members); Isabelle Van Damme, The
Interpretation of Schedules of Commitments, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 21 (2007)
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2. The facts: Mexican telecommunications regulations and WTO
commitments
With the concepts of accounting rates and the relation
between interconnection and modes of supply in mind, this
section examines the particular facts and law at issue in the
Telmex Report. The corporation at the heart of the eponymous
report, Télefonos de México (Telmex), is a major global player
in telecommunications. With the financial backing of the likes
of France Telecom and Southwestern Bell Corporation, in the
year preceding the Telmex Report Telmex ranked 21st in total
revenue out of all OECD service providers with 10.829 million
99
USD. Although monopolistic practices are forbidden under the
100
Mexican Constitution, prior to the adoption of the Telmex
Report, Telmex had a storied history of appropriating rents as
evidenced by findings that Telmex’s distortionary power in the
Mexican market had led to sub-standard service and a price
structure which reduced affordability for the average
101
Mexican.
Nevertheless, Telmex continuously opposed
(discussing the Appellate Body’s use of common intention in interpreting member’s
schedules).
99. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD
Communications
Outlook
2005,
26
tbl.1.1,
http://www.thepublicvoice.org/events/tunis05/oecd_outlook.pdf#search=%22OECD
%20Communications%20Outlook%22. Telmex is the centerpiece of billionaire
Carlos Slim Helú’s empire. See Marc Lacey, Carlos Slim Helú: The Reticent Media
Baron, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, at B1 (New York Edition). Mexico received the
second largest amount of foreign direct investment among developing countries
from 1990 to 2002 thanks largely to Telmex. Kálmán Kalotay, The Rise of Foreign
Direct Investment in the Telecommunications Services of Developing Countries, 5 J.
WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 811, 815 tbl.3 (2004).
100. Constitución Política de lo Estados Unidos Mexicanos art. 28 [C.P.], as
amended, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). For a
review of Mexican telecommunications law see Luz Estella Ortiz Nagle, Antitrust
in the International Telecommunications Sector: The United States Challenges
Mexico’s TELMEX Monopoly, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 183, 193–213 (2002).
101. Traci Carl, Callers, U.S. Phone Carriers in Common Cause Against High
Mexican Rates, ASS’D PRESS, Aug. 18, 2000, available at LEXIS, News File.
According to one study, in 2002 the monthly cost of a telephone subscription in
Mexico was .34% of per capita GDP, placing Mexico 51st out of 102 markets
surveyed. See also Kalotay, supra note 98, at 825 tbl.6 (citing THE GLOBAL
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY REPORT 2003–2004: TOWARDS AN EQUITABLE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 263 (Soumitra Dutta et. al. eds., 2004)). Despite the high
cost of its services, Telmex continues to generate a large volume of consumer
complaints. According to the latest statistics available from the Mexican consumer
protection agency, the Procuradoría Federal del Consumidor, Telmex ranked first
in the number of consumer complaints registered in 2006 and 2007, but ranked

KILL. Final Read Formatted - Fixed CDL

90

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

12/10/2010 2:11 PM

[Vol 20:1

government efforts to increase competition in the Mexican
102
telecommunications market. Telmex’s fight to maintain its
market power continued even in the wake of the findings
103
against Mexico in the Telmex Report. As a result, the Mexican
telecommunications regulations continued to be among the
most prohibitive with regard to foreign direct investment
104
among OECD countries following the Telmex Report.
At the time of the United States’ request for a panel,
Telmex’s monopoly power was already under attack both
105
domestically and internationally. In the 1990s the Mexican
Government established the Comisión Federal de Competencia
(CFC) and the Comisión Federal de Telecomunicaciones
106
(Cofetel) with mandates to promote competition. Increased
international and domestic regulation, however, threatened but
107
did not fundamentally undermine Telmex’s market power.
only third in this category in 2008. Procuradoría Federal del Consumidor 2006, at
15, http://www.profeco.gob.mx/n_institucion/inf_des/inf_anual06.pdf; Procuradoría
Federal
del
Consumidor
2007,
at
para.
5.1,
http://www.profeco.gob.mx/n_institucion/inf_des/inf_anual07.pdf;
Procuradoría
Federal
del
Consumidor
2008,
at
15,
http://www.profeco.gob.mx/n_institucion/inf_des/inf_anual08.pdf.
102. See Teléfonos de México S.A. de C.V. Boletín Informativo (2006),
http://www.telmex.com/mx/corporativo/salaPrensa_ComPrensa2006_060403ev.html
(discussing a joint venture between Telmex and Verizon).
103. See, e.g., ESTUDIO COMPARATIVO INTERNACIONAL DE TELEFONÍA FIJA
UTILIZANDO
LA
METODOLOGÍA
DE
CANASTAS
5
(2006),
http://www.telmex.com/mx/corporativo/pdf/estudio_nera_tarifas.pdf .
104. David Haugh, Roselyne Jamin & Bruno Rocha, Maximising Mexico’s Gains
From Integration in the World Economy, 31 tbl.4 (OECD Econ. Dep’t Working
Paper No. 657, Doc. No. ECO/WKP(2008)65, 2008).
105. See, e.g., Telmex Still Unable to Agree With Competitors on Interconnection
Nov.
11,
1998,
Fees
for
Long-Distance
Services,
SOURCEMEX,
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/TELMEX+STILL+UNABLE+TO+AGREE+WITH+C
OMPETITORS+ON+INTERCONNECTION+FEES...-a053211223
(describing
Telmex’s struggles in making agreements with other major telecommunications
companies, as well as domestic pressure from alliance groups).
106. Decreto por el que se crea la Comisión Federal de Telecomunicaciones
[Decree creating the Federal Telecommunications Commission], Díario Oficial de la
Federación [DO]. 9 de agosto de 1996 (Mex.); see also Shanker A. Singham, Market
Access and Market Contestability: Is the Difference Purely Semantics? A Business
Perspective, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 337, 359–61 (1999) (discussing the inaction of the
CFC in the face of its own and OECD findings of anti-competitive behavior on the
part of Telmex).
107. This scope of this article is limited to the impact of WTO law. For a
discussion of the effects of NAFTA on Mexican telecommunications see Sergio E.
Aleman, NAFTA and its Impact on the Privatization of Mexico’s
Telecommunications Industry, 7 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 5 (2001). For a discussion of
domestic efforts to curb Telmex’s market power see Oliver Solano, Rafael del Villar
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Although Telmex did not lack domestic critics, Telmex’s
accounting rate regime was not the subject of reform talks. This
is because, like most other emerging economies, Mexico was
and continues to be a net revenue recipient under the
108
accounting rate system.
As such, abandonment of the
accounting rate regime would result in decreased revenues
coming into Mexico.
The Federal Telecommunications Law (FTL), which
governed the routing of all incoming international
telecommunications traffic in Mexico, formed the cornerstone of
the regulatory regime challenged by the United States in the
109
Telmex Report. The FTL required each operator of a public
telecommunications network to possess a concession from the
110
Mexican Secretariat of Communications and Transportation.
The FTL further stipulated that such concessions would be
issued only to legal or physical persons of Mexican
111
nationality.
In 1996, the FTL was complemented by the
112
promulgation of the International Long Distance Rules (ILD).
The ILD established an accounting rate regime whereby the
concessionaire with the largest percentage of the long distance
business with a given country was entitled to negotiate the
termination fee that would be charged for all calls originating

& Rodrigo Garcia-Verdu, Challenges to the Effective Implementation of Competition
Policy in Regulated Sectors: The Case of Telecommunications in Mexico, 26 N.W. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 527 (2006).
108. See International Telecommunication Union, Direction of Traffic: Trading
Telecom
Minutes
Executive
Summary
(1999),
http://www.itu.int/ITUD/ict/publications/dot/1999/page11_dot.html (discussing how the accounting rate
system was favorable to developing countries). Calls originating in the United
States accounted for nearly two thirds of all U.S.—Mexico telephone traffic. Elliot
Blair Smith, Mexican Phone Company Sets Sights on ‘Telepirates’, USA TODAY,
June 19, 2001, at 6B. See also Guermazi, supra note 88, at 96 (noting that
developing countries recive large amounts of payments each year); Joseph &
Drahos, supra note 91, at 110–11 (discussing how the accounting rate system was
favorable to developing countries); Stanley, supra note 88, at 385 tbl.3 (showing
that Mexico received the largest amount of net settlement payments from the
United States in 1994).
109. Ley Federal de Telecommunicaciones [L.F.T] [Federal Telecommunications
Law], Díario Oficial de la Federación [DO]. 7 de junio de 1995 (Mex.).
110. Id. at art. 11.
111. Id. at art. 12.
112. Reglas para prestar el servicio de larga Distancia Internacional que
deberán aplicar los concesionarios de redes públicas de telecomunicaciones
autorizados para prestar este servicio [International Long Distance Rules], Díario
Oficial de la Federación [DO], 11 de diciembre de 1996 (Mex.).
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in that country regardless of which Mexican carrier actually
113
terminated the call. Thus, under the ILD if it were the case
that Telmex terminated 51% of phone calls originating in
Spain, for example, then Telmex would negotiate the fee
charged by all other telecommunications operators for
terminating the remaining 49% of the call volume from Spain.
At the time of the United States’ request for a panel, Telmex’s
predominant market share granted it the power to negotiate
the accounting rate charged on all calls originating from all
114
foreign countries.
During the course of negotiations at the WTO, Mexico
apparently attempted to harmonize its then extant domestic
regulations with its liberalization commitments under the WTO
Telecoms Agreement by placing the appropriate restrictions in
115
its Schedule of Specific Commitments.
Section 2 of the
Reference Paper contains the Mexican commitments to provide
interconnection within Mexico to international service
116
providers.
The scope of the Mexican commitments under
Section 2 is delimited by language in Section 2.1 which states
that Section 2 commitments apply “on the basis of the specific
commitments undertaken” in Mexico’s Schedule of Specific
117
Commitments.
Therefore, the obligations established in
Section 2 are binding on Mexico only to the extent to which
market access has been granted under Mexico’s Schedule of
118
Specific Commitments.
Mexico’s Schedule of Specific
Commitments for telecommunications services, in turn,
faithfully reflects the FTL’s requirement that all mode I supply
113. Id. at regs. 2:XII, 13.
114. See Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 2.2.
115. Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Mexico—Schedule of
Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/56/Suppl.2, 11 April 1997 [hereinafter Schedule of
Specific Commitments].
116. Reference Paper, supra note 8.
117. Schedule of Specific Committments, supra note 114, at § 2.1.
118. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.93–95; see also David Luff, Current
international trade rules relevant to telecommunications services, in THE WTO AND
GLOBAL CONVERGENCE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND AUDIO-VISUAL SERVICES 34,
39 (Damien Geradin & David Luff eds., 2004) (noting that limitations to the
obligations made by the WTO members are possible to the extent to which they are
described in the Schedule); Piet Eeckhout, Constitutional Concepts for Free Trade
in Services, in THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 211, 218
(Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2001) (noting that the specific
commitments of market access apply only to the extent that a member has agreed
to a service schedule); BRONCKERS & LAROUCHE, supra note 73, at 19.
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of telecommunications services, that is in cases where only the
services cross the border, must be routed through a company in
possession of a concession granted by the Mexican
119
Secretariat. Under mode III, the mode of supply requiring
commercial presence by the supplier in both the exporting and
importing Member countries, Mexico’s schedule inscribes the
FTL’s requirement that a concession from the Mexican
Secretariat be obtained in order to establish commercial
120
presence in Mexico. Because only Mexican corporations could
possess concessions from the Mexican Secretariat, the effect of
Mexico’s scheduled limitations on mode I and mode III supply
of telecommunications services was to require all foreign
telecommunications companies to use the services of a Mexican
telecommunications operator for the termination of calls within
121
Mexico. This, at least, is the apparent reading intended by
Mexico.
III. RIGHTS-BASED CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE
TELMEX REPORT
Such was the state of play facing the Telmex Panel.
Questions lingered regarding the extent to which the WTO
Telecoms Agreement disciplined accounting rates and whether
the
Reference
Paper’s
requirements
relating
to
“interconnection” applied when the hand-off occurred at a
border. Moreover, given the fact that the services seemed to be
supplied on a mode I basis from Mexico into the United States,
119. Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 114. The authentic Spanish
text reads “el tráfico internacional debe ser enrutado a través de las instalaciones de
una empresa con una concesión otorgada por la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y
Transportes (SCT).” GATS art. I:2 specifies that under mode I, services are supplied
“from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member.”
120. Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 114. GATS art. I:2 specifies
that under Mode 3 services are supplied “by a service supplier of one Member,
through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member.”
121. Although Mexico’s intent was to preclude market access by foreign owned
firms, Mexico’s schedule is best interpreted as a pre-commitment that signaled to
other Members the intention to reform the terms of market access at a point in the
future. See generally Rudolf Adlung, Public Services and the GATS, 9 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 455, 474 (2006) (noting that the opening of monopolies over time was a
key factor in the extended negotiations over telecommunications); see also Leroux,
supra note 13, at 258; Donald H. Regan, A Gambling Paradox: Why an OriginNeutral “Zero-Quota” is Not a Quota Under GATS Article XVI, 41 J. WORLD TRADE
1297, 1314 (2007).
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Mexico had seemingly shielded its domestic market from any
competition by limiting its market access commitments to
reflect the fact that its domestic regulatory regime did not
allow for foreign ownership of telecommunications companies.
Notwithstanding Mexico’s scheduled limitations, the Telmex
Panel found that the Reference Paper’s disciplines applied to
the facts of the dispute and held Mexico to be in violation of
four separate commitments under the WTO Telecoms
122
Agreement.
This section analyzes the Telmex Panel’s
approach, paying particular attention to the pivotal role of the
individual consumer in the Telmex Report’s treatment of modes
of supply. Based upon this factor, as well as the panel’s judicial
methodology, Part III concludes that the Telmex Report is best
understood
as
an
instantiation
of
rights-based
constitutionalism.
A. MODES OF SUPPLY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE CUSTOMER
The Telmex Report’s rights-based orientation is manifest in
the primacy assigned to the perspective of the individual
consumer when determining the scope of Mexico’s
commitments under the WTO Telecoms Agreement. As
discussed above, one of the central goals of the rights-based
constitutional project within the world trade regime is to
transform citizens from passive bystanders to active subjects
123
and bearers of rights under international trade law. The
Telmex Report achieves this aim, in function if not in form, by
shifting the lens of analysis for determining the scope of WTO
disciplines from the telecommunications companies and States
that have negotiated the terms of trade in international
telecommunications to the individual customer. Although the
WTO Telecoms Agreement was drafted to address the specific
concerns
and
needs
of
monopolistic
national
telecommunications carriers, the Telmex Report reimagines the
terms on which the concessions were granted based on the
assumed understanding of the individual consumer.
The critical passage in this regard comes in paragraphs
124
7.29 to 7.45 of the Telmex Report. In this section, the Telmex
122. See Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.216.
123. See supra notes 28–43, and accompanying text.
124. Telmex Report, supra note 5.
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Panel holds that the services at issue are being provided on a
mode I basis from the United States into Mexico, meaning that
the service is being exported from the United States and into
Mexico. Recall with regard to mode I supply Mexico had
specifically stated that all services must be routed through a
125
company holding a concession from the Mexican Secretariat.
Also recall that with regard to mode III supply, Mexico had not
committed to opening its telecommunications markets to
126
foreign operators with a physical presence in Mexico. Faced
with these two reservations, the only way that the Telmex
Panel could reach the merits of the dispute was to determine
that the services were being provided on a mode I basis from
the United States into Mexico, thereby reversing the standard
127
characterization of international telecommunications traffic.
In reaching its determination that the services are being
supplied on a mode I basis from the United States into Mexico
the Telmex panel relies upon the decisive influence of the
individual consumer’s perspective. The apotheosis of the
individual occurs at paragraph 7.42 when the panel states that
“[w]hat counts is the service that the supplier offers and has
128
agreed to supply to a customer.” Among a range of competing
factors, the dispositive consideration appears to be the
customer’s conception of the service at issue. The arrangements
between the international telecommunications operators which
had dominated the treatment and classification of international
telecommunications
service
are
subservient
to
the
arrangements between the domestic provider and domestic
consumer of these services. In the words of the panel,
[I]n the case of a basic telecommunication service, whether domestic
or international, or supplied cross-border or through commercial
presence, the supplier offers its customer the service of completing
the customer’s communications. Having done so, the supplier is
responsible for making any necessary subsidiary arrangements to
129
ensure that the communications are in fact completed.

Taken at its face value, the panel’s consumer-based
reorientation of the economic transactions in question is as
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See Schedule of Special Commitments, supra note 119.
See supra notes 115–121 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.42.
Id. at para. 7.42.
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distortionary as it is decisive; if the consumer believes that she
is buying an international service, then WTO law should
construe a given set of transactions as constituting an
international service to the consumer. Accordingly, the Telmex
Panel interpreted a set of transactions that had traditionally
been considered as constituting an export from Mexico into the
130
United as an export from the United States into Mexico. The
traditional legal characterization of the telecommunications
traffic between the United States and Mexico, however, would
have effectively precluded the panel from reaching the merits of
the U.S. complaint and left the individual consumer without
131
legal recourse. This is because the WTO Telecoms Agreement
does not discipline regulations relating to the terms under
132
which services are exported from a WTO Member. Therefore,
if the interests of the individual consumer were to be protected,
the services at issue had to be characterized as imports into,
not exports from, Mexico.
While the centrality of the consumer’s role in the Telmex
Report marked a new development for GATS jurisprudence,
this was not the first time that the role of the consumer had
been recognized in WTO panel reports. In US—Sections 301—
310 of the Trade Act of 1974 a panel noted that “it would be
entirely wrong to consider that the position of individuals is of
133
no relevance to the GATT/WTO legal matrix.” The panel in
that case noted that “one of the primary objects of the
GATT/WTO . . . is to produce certain market conditions which
134
would allow . . . individual activity to flourish.”
These
statements acknowledge the fact that, individuals, legal or real,
are the “real part[ies] in interest” in almost any imaginable
135
trade dispute. The scope of the individual’s role, however, has
remained sharply delimited. The Appellate Body, for example,
has clarified that the expectations of private rights holders
need not necessarily always be taken into account when

130. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 125–126 and accompanying text.
132. See Neven & Mavroidis, supra note 13, at 208.
133. Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
para. 7.73, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999).
134. Id. at para. 7.73.
135. ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN:
CONTRACT THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 (2006).
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interpreting the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual
136
Property Rights (“TRIPs”).
The role of consumers is also well established with respect
to considerations of “likeness” for purposes of determining
whether there has been discrimination against a particular
137
product under WTO law.
In this context, however, the
perspective of the consumer is but a component of the broader
inquiry to determine the competitive relationship between two
138
products.
It is the establishment of this competitive
relationship, considering the evidence as a whole, that
determines whether or not WTO non-discrimination disciplines
139
will apply to particular goods. In the Telmex Report, the
consideration of the individual’s perspective is contained in its
discussion of the context within which mode I supply should be
determined within the framework of Article 31 of the Vienna
140
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). In this regard,
the dicta could be considered to be consistent with other WTO
jurisprudence concerning the role of the individual.
Nevertheless, the Telmex Panel’s categorical pronouncement,
that “[w]hat counts is the service that the supplier offers and
141
has agreed to supply to a customer” marks a departure from
the language used in other panel and Appellate Body reports.
The Telmex Panel’s formulation seems to focus on the
consumer’s perspective to the exclusion of other evidence rather
than contextualize the consumer’s perspective as one piece of
evidence among many.
136. Appellate Body Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, para. 48, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997).
137. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, para. 92, WT/DS135/AB/R (March 12,
2001) (noting that the consumer will have a different view of “likeness” then
producers); Appellate Body Report, Korea—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, para. 114,
WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R (Jan. 18, 1999) (noting that determining whether a
competitive relationship exists between products is not exclusively determined by
consumer preference); Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures
Concerning Periodicals, 21, WT/DS31/R (June 30, 1997) (noting that likeness must
be determined on a case-by-case basis); Appellate Body Report, Japan—Alcoholic
Beverages II, 20, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Nov. 1, 1996)
(discussing the discretionary nature of making a “likeness” decision).
138. Appellate Body Report, European Communities supra note 135, at para.
117, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).
139. Id. at para.103.
140. VCLT, supra note 47.
141. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.42
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Ultimately, the Telmex Panel’s parsing and legal
characterization of the set of transactions that constitutes an
international telephone call confirm the primacy of the
individual consumer in establishing the outcome. Unless one is
willing to accept that the individual consumer’s perspective has
a transformative effect on the interpretation and application of
WTO law, how can it be the case that a transaction between a
U.S. consumer and a U.S. corporation constitutes mode I
supply “from the territory of one Member into the territory of
142
[another] Member”? Unless the perspective of the individual
is privileged, the Telmex Panel’s conclusions seem contradictory
143
or “untenable.”
The implications of the transformation
wrought by the Telmex Panel’s focus on the consumer’s
perspective are explored in Part IV below.
B. APPLYING THE REFERENCE PAPER—VINDICATING
CONSTITUTIONAL RULES

The shift of emphasis from the perspective of the
telecommunications carrier to the consumer and the
consequential determination that the services at issue were
being supplied on a mode I basis into Mexico, however, did not
ipso facto require the Telmex Panel to apply the disciplines of
the Reference Paper to the facts of the Telmex Report. The
interpretation of the scope of the Reference Paper disciplines
relating to interconnection and accounting rates remained an
open question even after establishing that the services at issue
were being provided on a mode I basis from the U.S. into
Mexico. While less controversial than the panel’s individual
focused reorientation of the legal conception of the mode of
supply services at issue, the panel approached these open
questions in a form consonant with the underlying
constitutional rule that lies at the heart of the rights-based
constitutionalist
theory
requiring
maximum
trade
liberalization as judged from the perspective of the
144
individual.

142. GATS, supra note 6, at art. 1(2)(a).
143. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 3, at 687.
144. See supra notes 44–54 and accompanying text.
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With regard to interconnection, the dominant view prior to
the Telmex Report was that the term did not encompass the
hand-off of telecommunications signals at an international
145
border. Thus, even following the Telmex Panel’s finding that
the services at issue were being supplied on a mode I basis from
the United States into Mexico, the panel could still have held
that the Reference Paper’s disciplines relating to
interconnection did not apply. The panel, however, focused on
the broad meaning of the term “linking” as used in the
Reference Paper’s definition of interconnection in holding that
Mexico’s interconnection commitments did apply to the services
146
at issue in the Telmex Report.
The Telmex Panel also had little trouble dismissing
Mexico’s objections that even if the Reference Paper’s
disciplines regarding interconnection applied to the hand-off of
telecommunications signals at an international border, the
specific discipline requiring interconnection fees to be “costoriented” could not apply. Mexico had argued that this was the
case because these fees were in fact “accounting rates” and
therefore could not be the subject of dispute settlement
proceedings as per the Understanding contained in the
February
1997
Report
of
the
Group
on
Basic
147
Telecommunications. The Telmex Panel’s legal reasoning in
this regard is sound. The panel states the fact that the
Understanding cannot directly alter the scope of Mexico’s
148
commitments under WTO law. Instead, the Understanding
can only offer guidance to the interpretation of Mexico’s
149
commitments under Section 2 of the Reference Paper.
Notwithstanding these facts, it has been argued that the
Telmex Panel’s conclusions with regard to the Reference
Paper’s requirement to provide interconnection at cost-oriented
rates are correct only if “§ 2.2(b) of the [Reference Paper] is
interpreted outside its context,” in the sense of VCLT Article
150
31. However, while it may be correct to assail the panel’s
interpretation of the WTO Telecoms Agreement as overly
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
Telmex Report, supra note 5, at paras. 7.102–06, 7.143.
See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text.
Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.126.
Id. at para.7.126.
Neven & Mavroidis, supra note 13, at 208.
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151

the panel’s stance may also be understood as
literalist,
implicitly constitutionalist. It may even be the case that on a
rights-based constitutional view the panel’s approach is in fact
consistent with the VCLT. For example, VCLT Article 31 states
that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
152
purpose.” Recall that for the rights-based constitutionalist
the purpose of the WTO is the defense of the constitutional
153
guarantee of free trade.
Therefore, from a rights-based
constitutional perspective, the Telmex Panel’s interpretation of
the Reference Paper is not so much inconsistent with the
context of the Reference Paper as it is consistent with the
overriding purpose of the Reference Paper and the WTO
154
itself.
C. THE ROLE OF JUDGES
The Telmex Report marked a radical departure from the
conventional
legal
characterization
of
international
telecommunications services within the industry and WTO
communities. By privileging the perspective of the consumer,
the panel paved the way for an expansive application of the
Reference Paper’s disciplines regarding interconnection. The
aggressive approach of the panel, particularly with regard to
establishing mode I supply between suppliers and consumers
located in the territory of a single WTO Member, is consistent
with the role envisaged for judges under a rights-based
constitutional theory.
The importance of the Telmex Panel’s broad assumption of
judicial prerogative is most evident when compared with the
151. Chung, supra note 13, at 790. Chung also points out that strict reliance on
the literal meaning of words “can be a useful tool to extend the scope of WTO
competence.” Id. at 788. It has also been argued that excessive literalism risks
results that contradict those intended by the negotiators. Richard H. Steinberg,
Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political
Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247, 261 (2004).
152. VCLT, supra note 47, at art. 31.1.
153. See supra notes 26–69 and accompanying text.
154. The panel itself stops short of explicit endorsement of a constitutional
justification, although it does state that a broad interpretation of the term
“interconnection” is consonant with the object and purpose of the GATS. Telmex
Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.121.
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result that would obtain under the accepted practice within
telecommunications law as agreed by States and
telecommunications carriers, or on a strict application of the
WTO scheduling guidelines as set forth by the GATT
Secretariat. Prior to the Telmex Report, international
telecommunications law and the telecommunications industry
had consistently treated termination of international phone
calls as a service exported from the terminating country and
155
imported into the originating country. Applying this logic to
the services at issue in the Telmex Report, there would
156
concededly be mode I supply, but in the reverse direction.
Instead of finding, as the Telmex Panel did, that there was
mode I supply of a service from the United States to Mexico,
there would be mode I supply of a service from Mexico to the
157
United States. In crafting a result that diverged from the
previously accepted practice of States and telecommunications
carriers on the one hand and the guidelines of the GATT
Secretariat on the other, the Telmex Panel fulfilled the rightsbased constitutional conception of a strong judiciary that acts
to protect individual interests by constraining governmental
158
powers.
With regard to WTO scheduling guidelines, although the
panel accorded “substantial interpretative weight” to an
159
Explanatory Note issued by the GATT Secretariat,
this
160
Note,
upon closer analysis points towards a different
161
conclusion than that adopted by the panel. The Explanatory
Note states that “the supply of a service through
telecommunications or mail . . . are all examples of cross-border
[mode I] supply, since the service supplier is not present within
162
the territory of the member where the service is delivered.”

155. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
158. See supra Part I(c).
159. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.43.
160. GATT Secretariat, Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in
Services: Explanatory Note, para. 19(a), MTN.GNS/W/164 (Sept. 3, 1993)
[hereinafter Explanatory Note].
161. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.43.
162. Explanatory Note, supra note 160, at para. 19(a). This text was repeated at
paragraph 28 of Guidelines for the Scheduling of Specific Commitments under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), WTO Doc. S/L/92 (Mar. 28, 2001).
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The Explanatory Note, however, does not support a finding that
the telecommunications services at issue in the Telmex Report
were being provided on a mode I basis into Mexico as the
163
Telmex Panel states.
In the first place, it should be clear that the reference to
“the supply of a service through telecommunications” in the
164
Explanatory Note cannot be understood as a reference to the
“public telecommunications transport services” at issue in the
165
166
Telmex Report. As the Telmex Panel correctly observed, the
GATS Annex on Telecommunications defines “public
telecommunications
transport
service”
as
“any
telecommunications transport service required, explicitly or in
effect, by a Member to be offered to the public generally [such
as] telegraph, telephone, telex, and data transmission typically
involving the real-time transmission of customer-supplied
information between two or more points without any end-toend change in the form or content of the customer’s
167
information.” Thus, for purposes of the Telmex Report there is
no doubt that the services at issue are the public voice
telephony, circuit-switched data transmission and facsimile
168
services themselves.
The ordinary meaning of the
Explanatory Note, in referring to “the supply of a service
through telecommunications,” establishes a distinction between
the telecommunications service itself and the distinct service
169
that is supplied via telecommunications. The Explanatory
Note says only that the latter is an example of cross-border
170
supply. On a proper reading the passage of the Explanatory
Note to which the Telmex Panel cites says nothing about the
163. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.43.
164. Explanatory Note, supra note160 at para. 19(a).
165. Telmex Report, supra note 5, atpara. 7.22
166. Id.at para. 7.22
167. GATS, supra note 6, at Annex on Telecommunications art. 3(b). The final
gerundial phrase here cannot be construed according to the canon of reddendo
singula singulis. To read the text thusly would result in an interpretation whereby
only data transmission services would occur without changes in form or content of
customer information. It cannot have been the drafters’ intent to indicate that this
qualifier applied only to data transmission services, whereas information provided
via telegraph, telephone and telex services underwent changes in form and content
during transmission.
168. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.23
169. Explanatory Note, supra note 160 at para. 19(a).
170. Id.
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cross-border supply of “telecommunications services” in their
own right, but rather only addresses services that use
telecommunications as a delivery platform.
Positive and negative contextual comparison confirms that
the Explanatory Note does not address the question of
telecommunications services as such. The full text of paragraph
19 (a) reads: “International transport, the supply of a service
through telecommunications or mail, and services embodied in
exported goods (e.g. a computer diskette, or drawings) are all
examples of cross-border supply, since the service supplier is
not present within the territory of the Member where the
171
service is delivered.” The negative comparison is made with
the first category of cross-border supply identified by the
172
Explanatory Note, “international transport.”
Whereas the
other two categories of supply include the word “service”,
international transport does not. This implies that
international transport is, of itself, a service, where as the
other two categories enumerated concern only services that
cross borders either “through telecommunications or mail” or
“in exported goods.” This comparison establishes that the
Explanatory Note’s reference to “the supply of a service through
telecommunications” refers to telecommunications not as a
service in itself, but rather as a modality through which a given
service moves across a border.
The positive comparison to be made here is between two
prepositional phrases “through telecommunications” and “in
exported goods.” As stated above, both phrases describe a
modality through which a given service moves across a border.
The text supports the conclusion that the Explanatory Note
identifies “telecommunications” as an example of mode I supply
only if the service itself and the modality through which the
service moves across the border are read as constituting a
single service. Yet if this approach is applied to “services
embodied in exported goods,” this would result in a finding that
the “exported goods” are a service that is provided on a crossborder basis. Obviously this cannot be the proper reading

171. Id.
172. Id.
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because “exported goods” are self-evidently not a “service”
falling under the disciplines of the GATS.
In light of the fact that the plain meaning and contextual
analysis of the Explanatory Note establish that the Explanatory
Note does not speak to whether or not telecommunications
services are an illustrative example of the types of services that
are provided on a mode I basis, the Explanatory Note’s
reasoning takes on a heightened importance. The Explanatory
Note states that the examples contained therein constitute
mode I supply “since the service supplier is not present within
173
the territory of the Member where the service is delivered.”
Transposing this text into the customer-centric parlance of the
174
Telmex Panel, the Explanatory Note’s meaning is that mode I
supply occurs where the supplier is not present in the territory
of the Member in which the customer is present.
Although the Telmex Panel emphasizes the same words in
the above-quoted text, the panel’s legal conclusion does not
cohere with notions of delivery and supply as articulated in the
Explanatory Note, or indeed by the Telmex Panel itself. The
Telmex Panel states that the critical factor in determining the
mode of supply is the service that the supplier “has agreed to
supply to the customer” and that the “supplier offers its
customer the service of completing the customer’s
175
communications.” The various inputs that the supplier must
secure in order to provide the service are considered
“subsidiary arrangements” which do not displace the primacy of
176
the agreement between the supplier and the customer.
Therefore, if one were to search for the locus “where the service
177
is delivered,” to use the terms of the Explanatory Note, this
can only be the place where the customer is found in the United
States. To state otherwise would be nonsensical on the panel’s
own logic which acknowledges that the services in question are
being supplied “to the customer” and not to the terminus point
178
in Mexico. Thus, the service is being delivered, or supplied, to
the customer wherever it is that the customer is to be found.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. (emphasis added).
See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text.
Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.42.
Id.
Explanatory Note, supra note 160, at para. 19(a).
Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para.7.42.
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On the facts of the Telmex Report, both the service supplier and
the customer are found in the territory of a single WTO
Member, viz. the United States. Therefore, it is patently not
the case that “the service supplier is not present within the
179
territory of the Member where the service is delivered.”
Accordingly, if the consumer’s perspective is truly the relevant
level of analysis, a strict application of the Explanatory Note to
the facts of the Telmex Report would require a finding that
there was no mode I supply because the service supplier is
present in the territory of the Member where the service is
delivered.
The text of the Telmex Report indicates that the Telmex
Panel was aware that the identification of mode I cross-border
supply of a service in a situation where both consumer and
supplier are found on the territory of a single WTO Member
was at least questionable. For example, the Telmex Panel
stated that the “silence of subparagraph (a) [of Article I:2
GATS] with respect to the supplier suggests that the place
where the supplier itself operates, or is present, is not directly
180
relevant to the definition of cross-border supply.”
Notwithstanding this assertion, the conception of mode I
supply put forth in the Telmex Report has been undercut by
subsequent jurisprudence that conforms to the proper reading
of the Explanatory Note set forth above. In distinguishing
between “remote supply” of a service and “cross-border supply”
the panel in US-Gambling made clear that cross-border supply
occurs “only when the service supplier and the consumer are
181
located in territories of different Members.” This is strong
evidence that the panel in Telmex was indeed overreaching in
this regard.
The Telmex Panel’s bold posture is best viewed as a
manifestation of the privileged position reserved for judges
within rights-based constitutional theory. In the course of
179. Explanatory Note, supra note 160, at para. 19 (a), supra note 162
(emphasis added). Of course, the Mexican service suppliers are not present in the
territory of the Member where the service is delivered, but as we have already seen
a finding that the services at issue are being exported from Mexico to the USA on a
mode I basis would have no utility in vindicating consumer interests. See note 155
and following text. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
180. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.30.
181. Panel Report, US—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, para. 6.32, WT/DS285/R, (10 November 1004).
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interpreting a document, the Reference Paper, that “makes
eminent sense [as] an obligation to impose minimum
competition-law requirements to incumbents, in full respect of
the territoriality principle conferring jurisdiction,” the panel
182
staked out a new course.
That new course placed the
individual at the center of the determinative analysis with
regard to the scope of rights under WTO law and effectively
expanded the liberalization commitments beyond what had
been envisaged by the negotiators.
Further, the panel’s embrace of a heightened role for
judges in increasing liberalization is confirmed by the fact that
the panel’s pronouncements on the centrality of the individual
consumer in establishing under which mode of supply a
particular service falls do not appear to be in the nature of a
direct response to the arguments of either party. The United
States had contended that the services in question were being
provided on a mode I basis on the grounds that the traffic or
transmissions themselves were a service and these
183
transmissions were patently crossing the border.
On the
other side, Mexico’s submissions focused on distinguishing
between the concept of a telephone call and the act of
184
transmitting customer provided data by a supplier. The panel
apparently took the initiative by itself to carve out a role for the
individual in the international trade law relating to
telecommunications.
IV. LESSONS FROM TELMEX
Although some express bewilderment at the seemingly
innocuous introduction of constitutionalism at the international
185
level, the stakes are undoubtedly high. Part III demonstrated
how a rights-based constitutionalist approach can alter the
outcome in a given trade dispute. Part IV considers the broader
implications of the rights-based approach of the Telmex Report
for the WTO both in terms of its jurisprudence and as an
institution.
182. Neven & Mavroidis, supra note 13, at 208.
183. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at paras. 7.25–26.
184. Id. at paras. 7.27–28
185. Fassbender, supra note 16, at 839.
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A. COUNTERINTUITIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE TELMEX
APPROACH
If one applies the Telmex Panel’s customer oriented
approach to certain services, the legal characterization of cross
border transactions becomes the inverse of that which the
negotiating parties would consider them to be. For example,
imagine that the Telmex Panel’s dictum that “[w]hat counts is
the service that the supplier offers and has agreed to supply to
186
a customer” were to be applied to legal characterization of the
transactions involved in the cross-border provision of customer
187
service via telecommunications. Often, if not predominantly,
in situations of cross-border customer service provision a
customer places a domestic telephone call which is then routed
across an international border by the service supplier. The
customer’s call is then answered in the territory of another
WTO Member from which the service, be it software support,
financial advice, travel booking, etc., is provided.
On a view which does not privilege the perspective of the
consumer, cross-border provision of customer service via
telecommunications constitutes a paradigmatic case of mode I
supply: customer service is being exported from the Member
into which the call has been placed and imported into the
territory of the Member where the consumer who placed the
188
call is located. If, however, the individual’s perspective forms
the dominant prism of analysis, then the transaction becomes
purely domestic because the consumer has placed a domestic
call and has, we may assume for purposes of this discussion,
contracted domestically for the provision of a service. The
subcontracts and telecommunications routing that the primary
supplier has concluded with the foreign service providers are
recast as “subsidiary arrangements to ensure that the
189
communications are in fact completed.” In the Telmex Report
186. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.42.
187. Under the Services Sectoral Classification List the cross-border provision
of customer service via telecommunications is capable of including services
catalogued under Professional Services; Computer and Related Services; Other
Business Services; and Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Services. Services
Sectoral Classification List, MTN.GNS/W/120 (July 10, 1991).
188. See Explanatory Note, supra note 160, at para. 19(a); Council for Trade in
Services, Guidelines for the Scheduling of Specific Commitments under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), para. 28, S/L/92 (Mar. 28, 2001).
189. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.42.

KILL. Final Read Formatted - Fixed CDL

108

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

12/10/2010 2:11 PM

[Vol 20:1

the panel’s focus on the individual consumer converted what
was traditionally seen as an export from Mexico into an export
from the United States. In the case of remote provision of
customer service, however, the same approach would convert
what was traditionally seen as an export from the Member to
which the phone call had been routed into a purely domestic
transaction, notwithstanding the clear cross-border aspects.
This finding would preclude the application of any WTO
disciplines and leave the Member in which the individual
consumer was located free to place restrictions on the remote
provision of customer service from other Members, even if the
Member enacting the restrictions had made commitments in
the relevant sectors.
Although this recasting of international trade in the
remote provision of customer service is a logical consequence of
the panel’s focus on the role of the individual, it is equally as
inconsistent with the goals of the rights-based constitutional
190
project as it is with WTO law. Nevertheless, it serves as
useful illustration of the fact that increased recognition of the
rights of individuals within the world trading system need not,
and indeed likely will not, ultimately lead to increased
liberalization. Recalibrating the legal instruments of the WTO
based on the rights and perspectives of individuals will lead to
both trade promoting and trade restricting outcomes. Only by
assuming that all affected parties will immediately see the
wisdom of increased liberalization can blanket recognition of
individual rights at the WTO function as a plausible path to
increased liberalization. There are good reasons to doubt the
validity of such an assumption. In fact, to the limited extent
that WTO law has recognized individual rights to date the
effect has been to empower individuals to inhibit trade, rather
191
than to force further liberalization.
B. IMPACT ON NEGOTIATIONS
In the context of the WTO it is clear that the outcomes of
certain disputes have an increasing impact on ongoing

190. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
191. See Steve Charnovitz, The WTO and the Rights of the Individual, 36
INTERECONOMICS 98, 108 (2001).
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192

As established above, the Telmex Report
negotiations.
employed a rights-based constitutionalist approach to the
application of the WTO Telecoms Agreement so as to arrive at
conclusions that seem contradictory, for example the finding
that a transaction between a U.S. supplier and a U.S. consumer
constitutes cross-border supply of a service. Despite these
observations, the panel’s approach in the Telmex Report has
elicited almost no overt adverse reaction with regard to
negotiations in the intervening years; ongoing negotiations do
193
not show signs of revisiting the panel’s conclusions. Indeed,
even in the immediate aftermath of the Telmex Report the
WTO Secretariat noted that Members were “remarkably
uniform in calling for further improvements in market access
and national treatment, the undertaking of commitments by
Members that have not yet done so, and more widespread
194
adoption of Reference Paper commitments.” The Chairman of
the Council for Trade in Services did identify “scheduling- and
classification-related
concerns”
in
the
area
of
telecommunications, but these are vague and of minor
importance when compared with the scheduling issues to be
195
addressed under other sectoral classifications.
Overall,
telecommunications liberalization continues to enjoy broad
196
support among WTO Members.
The general lack of outcry among Members in response to
the Telmex Report is likely attributable to the fact that the field
of telecommunications law is in some ways uniquely well suited
as a test case for building acceptance of judicial liberalization
under a rights-based constitutional theory. Liberalization in
telecommunications services carries an expectation of increased

192. See Petersmann, Addressing Institutional Challenges, supra note 52, at
650.
193. See Peng, supra note 10, at 305–06.
194. Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Information Note by
the Secretariat: Telecommunications Services, para. 2, JOB(05)/208 (Sept. 26, 2005).
195. Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Report by the
Chairman to the Trade Negotiations Committee, at 14, TN/S/23 (Nov. 28, 2005).
Also, the Chairman’s summary of the scheduling issues to be addressed under
modes I and III make no mention of the complications arising from the Telmex
Report. Id. at 21–22.
196. See Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee, Rep. by the Chairman
of the TNC: Services Signalling Conference, paras. 11–12, JOB(08)/93 (July 30,
2008).
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197

efficiency, technology and public welfare gains. As a result,
telecommunications negotiations at the WTO have benefitted
from the broad consensus among Members that a more efficient
and technologically advanced telecommunications sector
198
creates increased opportunities across other business sectors.
Indeed,
much
of
the
liberalization
achieved
in
telecommunications during the Uruguay Round was
attributable to the efforts of the financial services lobby and the
telecommunications
sector’s
own
technology
driven
199
liberalization. In addition, the fact that Egypt and Honduras
have unilaterally inscribed schedules liberalizing their
respective telecommunications sectors without receiving
corresponding concessions from other Members demonstrates
that the consensus recognizing the benefits to be gained from
telecommunications liberalization has spread to developing
200
countries as well. Mexico’s failure to appeal the panel’s report
197. See Chung, supra note 13, at 793–94; Massimo Geloso Grosso, Liberalising
Infrastructure Network Services and the GATS 35 (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Trade Policy Working Paper Series, Paper No. 34, Doc.
No., 2006); Bernard Hoekman, Liberalizing Trade in Services: A Survey (World
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series, Paper No. WPS 4030, 2006); Daniel
Roseman, Economic Impact of Trade and Investment Liberalization in the
Telecommunications Sector, 3 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 943, 943–44 (2002).
198. See Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Communication
from Australia, Canada, the European Communities, Japan, Hong Kong China,
Korea, Norway, Singapore, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,
Kinmen and Matsu, and the United States, TN/S/W/50, (July 1, 2005); Special
Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Communication from Cuba, TN/S/W/2,
(May 30, 2002); Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services,
Communication from Colombia, S/CSS/W/119, (Nov. 27, 2001); Special Session of
the Council for Trade in Services, Communication from Chile, para. 29,
S/CSS/W/88, (May 14, 2001); Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services,
Communication from Switzerland, para. 1, S/CSS/W/72, (May 4, 2001); see also
Kalotay, supra note 99, at 822–23.
199. See Pierre Sauvé, Been there, not yet done that: Lessons and challenges in
services trade, in GATS AND THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
SERVICES 599, 607–08 (Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl & Pierre Sauvé eds., 2008);
Adlung, supra note 121, at 470–71; Cowhey, supra note 72, at 53–54; Roseman,
supra note 93, at 84.
200. See Rudolf Adlung, Trade liberalization under the GATS: An Odyssey?, in
GATS AND THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES 209, 214
(Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl & Pierre Sauvé eds., 2008). The schedules are
available at GATS/SC/30/Suppl.3, 5 June 2002 (Egypt), and GATS/SC/38/Suppl.2,
16 September 2005 (Honduras). Pascal Lamy highlighted Egypt’s experience as a
success story in a symposium held on the 10th anniversary of the WTO Telecoms
Agreement. Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO DG Lamy celebrates
benefits of opening trade in telecoms (Feb. 20, 2008), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres08_e/pr517_e.htm.
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has been cited as an indication that perhaps the Mexican
government welcomed the opportunity to further its
deregulation of telecommunications without the hefty political
201
cost at home.
Members’ interest in overcoming intransigent domestic
regulatory hurdles to liberalization could also account for the
general acquiescence in the Telmex Panel’s reorientation of the
legal characterization of the services involved which brought
the hand-off of international telecommunications traffic within
the discipline of the Reference Paper. As is the case for any
service, the web of internal regulations involving any number
of domestic government agencies can complicate and frustrate
202
attempts at liberalization. Even a grant of full market access
can be rendered meaningless by an uncomplimentary
203
regulatory regime.
Moreover, the disparate domestic
regulatory approaches to “interconnection” that had been
adopted after entry into force of the WTO Telecoms Agreement
204
placed the credibility of the WTO at risk. Therefore, given the
broad consensus in favor of telecommunications liberalization,
201. See MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 3, at 684 n.231 (contending that no
appeal was made in order to shift the blame for the political fallout); but see Heinz
Hauser, Mexico—Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services WTO NEWS
(Univ. of St. Gallen/Swiss Inst. For Int’l Econ. & Applied Econ. Research, St.
Gallen,
Switz.),
Nov.
2004,
at
3,
http://www.siaw.unisg.ch/org/siaw/web.nsf/SysWebRessources/wtonews11epdf/$FIL
E/wtonews11e.pdf (arguing that the fact that there was no appeal “can be viewed
as an indicator of the high quality of the legal reasoning.”). Given the analysis in
this article, the explanation provided by Matsushita et al. is more convincing and,
moreover, coheres with the idea that the WTO is useful as a safety valve for
depoliticizing certain issues. See Damian Chalmers, Administrative Globalisation
and Curbing the Excesses of the State, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE
GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL REGULATION 351, 365 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann eds., 2006); Petersmann, Dispute Settlement, supra note 17, at 230;
Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, supra note 17, at
436–37. It is also likely that industrial consumers of telecommunications would
have been in favor of the Telmex Report and therefore may have lobbied against
appeal. See Adlung, supra note 200, at 213. Although, Telmex no doubt is a
powerful lobby within the Mexican government, domestic trade authorities must
balance the concerns of other lobbies impacted by WTO disputes among other
factors in determining whether or not to pursue a given course of litigation. See
GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN
WTO LITIGATION 60–64 (2003).
202. See Anupam Chander, Trade 2.0, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 281, 299 (2009).
203. See Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, GATS 2000:
Telecommunications, para. 11, S/CSS/W/35 (Dec. 22, 2000); Peng, supra note 10, at
305–06.
204. See Roseman, supra note 93, at 98.
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the outcome legitimacy of the Telmex Report likely accounts for
the muted impact of the more radical implications of rightsbased constitutionalism contained therein.
To the extent that the success of telecommunications
negotiations is attributable to the factors discussed above, this
does not preclude the possibility that the deleterious effects of
the Telmex Report’s approach to judicial constitutionalization
could manifest elsewhere. It could be the case that the
institutional deficiencies exposed by the Telmex Report in the
form of a perceived widening of the liberalization commitments
beyond the original intentions of Members is preventing
breakthroughs in sectors that do not share the endogenous
drive for liberalization that characterizes telecommunications.
If States perceive that their basic bargains are recalibrated to
take into account customer or consumer interests they may
reduce their appetite not only for future concessions, but also
205
for delegation of power to the adjudicatory organs. It has been
observed that an “approach of resolving uncertainty against the
206
regulator” can lead to lessened future liberalization. Thus,
the failure to make progress in the education, health care,
postal-courier sectors, etc. could reflect Members’ uncertainty
207
about the ability to predict the scope of their commitments.
In this regard, the Telmex Report’s blurring of the lines with
regard to modes of supply seems germane to the current
stalemate. Observers do not predict a breakthrough with
208
regard to competition policy and regulation. At least one
209
reason is the perceived lack of clarity provided by the GATS.
Members’ reticence regarding uncertainty of commitments,
combined with the tendency for GATS disciplines to strike deep
into the heart of the regulatory state, is reflected in the
205. See Trachtman & Moremen, supra note 22, at 225–26.
206. See Regan, supra note 121, at 1315–16. The Appellate Body has stated
implicitly that employment of a bias in favor of increased liberalization is
inappropriate as a method of interpreting the covered agreements. See Appellate
Body Report, European Communities—Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless
Chicken Cuts, paras. 241–43, WT/DS269/AB/R, (Sept. 12, 2005).
207. See
Services:
Negotiations—State
of
Play,
WTO.ORG,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/state_of_play_e.htm; see also Aaditya
Mattoo, Services in a Development Round: Three Goals and Three Proposals, 39 J.
WORLD TRADE 1223, 1231 (2005); Marsden, supra note 13, at 9.
208. See Peng, supra note 10, at 316–17.
209. See Alejandro Jara & M. del Carmen Domínguez, Liberalization of Trade
in Services and Trade Negotiations, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 113, 117 (2006).

KILL. Final Read Formatted - Fixed CDL

2011]

12/10/2010 2:11 PM

CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WTO

113

proposal that future negotiations be predicated upon an
understanding that services negotiations focus on non210
discrimination to the exclusion of other obligations.
This
approach presumes that a narrow focus on non-discrimination
211
would elicit greater liberalization commitments. The evidence
from the Telmex Report, however, demonstrates that if the
rights-based constitutionalist approach were to gain currency
among the WTO adjudicatory organs, then perhaps even
narrowly designed commitments based only on nondiscrimination would be susceptible to expansive interpretation
consistent with constitutional guarantees of economic freedom.
C. ASSESSING RIGHTS-BASED CONSTITUTIONALISM AND WTO
LEGITIMACY

Because constitutionalization is “instrumental to the
212
achievement of other values,”
it is appropriate for the
adjudicatory organs to adopt constitutional strategies that
contribute to the achievement of the values for which the WTO
was avowedly established. These include raising income levels,
increasing
employment
and
respecting
sustainable
213
development goals.
The WTO, however, can only achieve
these goals in the long-term if it enjoys institutional legitimacy
and the support of its constituents. While the result in the
Telmex Report undoubtedly contributes to increased
liberalization, the consequences of the rights-based
constitutionalist policy preferences and methodology evidenced
in the Telmex Report could ultimately weaken the institutional
legitimacy of the WTO.
The Telmex Report, at first glance appears to have been a
robust success in economic terms. With regard to outcome
legitimacy, or the perceived ameliorative effect of an
institutional action, the Telmex Report has had a salutary
impact on the state of telecommunications commerce between
the United States and Mexico. The Telmex Report dealt a blow
to an entrenched monopoly that repeatedly demonstrated its

210. See Mattoo, supra note 207, at 1224.
211. Id. at 1224.
212. Trachtman, supra note 16, at 630.
213. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 154.
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willingness to seek higher rents at the expense of its
214
customers. As has been seen from Telmex’s decades long
success in maintaining its domestic market power, the
intransigence of WTO Members in negotiating a transition to
market-based accounting rates was in large part a product of
the huge rents which the regulatory regime provided to
215
incumbent suppliers.
The pre-Telmex Report status quo,
216
however, was wildly inefficient. The Telmex Report alleviated
some of the inefficiency of this old system, a fact which is not
217
denied even by critics of the panel’s reasoning. Data for the
year following the Telmex Report shows that traffic originating
in the United States and terminating in Mexico rose by over
218
95%.
Moreover, the opaque nature of accounting rates
219
rendered any civil-society lead reform in this area unlikely.
The effect of the Telmex Report could therefore be seen as

214. See supra notes 100–105 and accompanying text.
215. See Cowhey, supra note 72, at 52–56 (discussing the problems associated
with accounting rate negotiations from a political economy perspective).
216. In 1996 the U.S. Federal Communications Commission estimated that
economic rents accounted for 80% of international telecommunications revenue. See
id. at 58.
217. See Neven & Mavroidis, supra note 13, at 217.
218. See 2004 FCC INT’L TELECOMMUNICATIONS DATA 1, 39–44 tbl.A1 (2006),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/ib/sand/mniab/traffic/files/CREPOR04.pdf; 2003
FCC INT’L TELECOMMUNICATIONS DATA 1, 38–43 tbl.A1 (2005), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/ib/sand/mniab/traffic/files/CREPOR03.pdf. Note, however, that
the impact of the Telmex Report should not be overstated as trade related
telecommunications issues continued to arise between Mexico and the United
States following the Telmex Report. See generally 2008 USTR SEC. 1377 REV. 1, 8
(2008)
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Results%20of%20the%202008%201377%20R
eview.pdf (dispute involving mobile termination rates pending COFETEL
resolution); 2007 USTR SEC. 1377 REV. 1, 4 (2007) available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Results%20of%20the%202007%201377%20R
eview.pdf (dispute involving Mexico’s failure to implement COFETEL’s
recommended interconnection rates); 2006 USTR SEC. 1377 REV. 1, 3 (2006)
available
at
http://ustraderep.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Telecom-Ecommerce/Section_1377/asset_upload_file43_9276.pdf
(contention
involving
COFETEL’s failure to release interconnection rate model to resolve dispute
between Mexican cellular and fixed-line companies).
219. See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC
GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 27–28 (1982). The Telmex Report
could even be described as democracy-reinforcing to the extent that it increased the
transparency of accounting rates qua trade restriction. See John O. McGinnis &
Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 546–48
(2001).
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positive when assessed by the criterion of the immediate
220
perceived overall economic benefits.
Nevertheless, despite the consensus appraisal of the
Telmex Report outcome, the economic impact of the Telmex
Report is not unambiguously positive for all stakeholders. The
Telmex Report can be seen as offering evidence in support of
those who see rights-based constitutionalism within the WTO
as a threat to a State’s ability to define and pursue its own
development program. For years, developed countries such as
the United States implemented a policy of cross-subsidization
221
to support efforts to achieve universal service. This policy
allowed telecommunications providers to expand into markets
222
that otherwise would have lacked service. Today, developing
countries employ accounting rates, notwithstanding their trade
distortionary effects, as an important tool in efforts to expand
223
their own networks. The principle benefit of this strategy is
that it allows telecommunications providers to fund an increase
in the reach of the telecommunications networks until a
hypothetical point in the future when the system is eventually
liberalized. On an uncharitable view, the Telmex Report shortcircuited the network development and liberalization process in
Mexico by instituting a modern U.S. style industrial policy
224
rooted in corporate autonomy. The reverse of the increased
220. See Gary N. Horlick, Comment, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY:
THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 259, 259 (Roger B.
Porter et al. eds., 2001).
221. See Sidak & Singer, supra note 13, at 20; Rohlfs & Sidak, supra note 79, at
333.
222. See Sidak & Singer, supra note 13, at 20; Rohlfs & Sidak, supra note 79, at
327.
223. See Guermazi, supra note 88, at 105.
224. See Dan Sarooshi, Sovereignty, Economic Autonomy, the United States,
and the International Trading System: Representations of a Relationship, 15 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 651, 657–58 (2004). Recent interventions in the financial and automotive
industries place the consistency of the U.S. ideological outlook in doubt. Certainly
one cannot imagine the United States saying now, as it did in 2003 with respect to
the negotiation of subsidies disciplines, that the “fundamental issue is: should
governments be investing in private sector companies and if so, under what
circumstances? While it could be argued that the nature of capital markets in
certain lesser developed countries may lead to government investment in the
private sector, what is the justification in countries with well-developed capital
markets? . . . If the equity markets determine that a company will not generate a
market return, the actions of any government which determines otherwise should
be subject to strengthened disciplines.” Negotiating Group on Rules, Subsidies
Disciplines Requiring Clarification and Improvement: Communication from the
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economic efficiency coin is that, in the wake of the Telmex
Report, Telmex will have a decreased capacity to expand its
network towards the goal of universal service, a right explicitly
225
recognized in the Reference Paper.
Critics of rights-based constitutionalism warn against
226
precisely these sorts of outcomes. By privileging economic
freedoms, rights-based constitutionalism obscures competing
concerns and drastically restricts the policy options available to
meet other development or social goals. Moreover, by
purporting to remove certain “constitutionalized” principles
from the realm of negotiations or politics, rights-based
constitutionalization can reduce the scope for democratic
227
decisions at the national level. This can increase the WTO’s
democratic deficit by shielding Members from accepting full
228
responsibility for WTO norms. Most criticism in this vein
focuses on rights-based constitutionalism’s distortionary impact
229
on human rights. Nevertheless, the Telmex Report shows that
a rights-based constitutional approach to trade can affect other
policy choices, in this case, the progression towards universal
telecommunications service.
Even assuming that resolving disputes according to rightsbased constitutional theory would increase overall welfare, the
constitutionalist claim that the economic gains from trade
resulting from an aggressive judicial posture can endow the
WTO with the legitimacy necessary to perpetuate its
230
institutional mission has certain flaws. On a rights-based
constitutionalist theory, the gains from trade described above
are seen as providing a “utilitarian justification” for the
United States, 4, TN/RL/W/78 (Mar. 19, 2003).
225. Reference Paper, supra note 8, para. 3 (“Any member has the right to
define the kind of universal service obligation it wishes to maintain. Such
obligations will not be regarded as anti-competitive per se, provided they are
administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively neutral
manner and are not more burdensome than necessary for the kind of universal
service defined by the Member.”).
226. See generally Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra note 4; Sarooshi, supra note 224,
at 658–60; Howse, supra note 69, at 95.
227. See Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra note 4, at 228; cf. Klabbers, supra note 20,
at 47, 50–51.
228. See TOMER BROUDE, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE WTO: JUDICIAL
BOUNDARIES AND POLITICAL CAPITULATION 34 (2004).
229. See generally Howse, supra note 1; Alston, supra note 29, at 824.
230. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
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liberalization of the international trading system. Welfare
promotion qua institutional goal is a “constitutional insight”
232
that increases the trading system’s legitimacy. Therefore, the
increased efficiency and net welfare gain of the Telmex Report
directly supports the legitimacy of the WTO. This theory of
legitimacy, however, overlooks the fact that while the WTO is
ostensibly an agreement about non-discrimination and
economic freedom, it does not solely memorialize these
principles. The years of careful negotiations that culminated
not only in the GATS, but also in the TRIPs, Technical Barriers
to Trade, and Sanitary and Phytosanitary agreements can
neither be reduced to nor legitimately placed in the service of a
233
simple mantra of liberalization. The WTO cannot rely solely
upon an exogenous ideology to perpetuate its legitimacy, but
234
rather must evolve for the benefit of its constituents. The
question remains as to who its constituents are. Despite calls
for opening the Dispute Settlement System to private
235
litigants, States, or in WTO parlance, Members, remain the
236
WTO’s constituents. Thus, while it may be proper in some
circumstances for the WTO to consider the impact of its actions
237
on citizens independent of their governments, it is another
231. See Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and
‘Constitutional Justice’, supra note 33, at 796. But see Econ. & Soc. Council,
Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination &
Protection of Minorities, The Realization of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights:
Human rights as the primary objective of international trade, investment and
finance policy and practice, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/11 (June 17, 1999)
(by J. Oloko-Onyango & Deepika Udgama) (stating that “liberalization in the global
regimes of trade, investment and finance does not, ipso facto, lead to more positive
impacts on the well-being of humankind in general or to the enhancement of
economic development in particular.”).
232. See Petersmann, Addressing Institutional Challenges, supra note 52, at
663.
233. See Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401,
404–06 (2000).
234. Trachtman, supra note 16, at 626.
235. See Georgios I. Zekos, The Case for Giving Private Parties Access to the
WTO Dispute Settlement System, 8 J. WORLD INVESTMENT& TRADE 441, 449 (2007).
236. Pascal Lamy, The Place of the WTO and its Law in the International Legal
Order, 17 EJIL 969, 974 (2007); Klabbers, supra note 20, at 43; Alston, supra note
29, at 834. States themselves prefer to view the WTO from a contractual as
opposed to constitutional perspective. See Carmody, supra note 9, at 539;
Trachtman and Moremen, supra note 22, at 229.
237. See Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the
Promotion & Protectionof Human Rights, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights:
Mainstreaming the right to development into international trade law and policy at
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thing to depart from the bargains that the governments have
struck.
Without fetishizing certain conceptions of sovereignty or
238
the WTO as a “member-driven institution”
it is entirely
appropriate to consider States’ view of the system when
assessing the best way to move forward. In a domestic setting
where judgments are typically backed by the Weberian
monopoly on the legitimate use of force, lack of this subjective
legitimacy is unlikely to result in non-compliance. In the
international setting, however, the paucity of coercive means
for ensuring compliance coupled with, or even arising out of,
the sovereign equality of the parties to a given dispute places a
premium on the ability of a judicial institution to cohere with
the expectations of the States that have vested the institution
with its power. This setting places into high relief the words of
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter that a “[c]ourt’s
authority . . . ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in
239
its moral sanction.”
International organizations remain
acutely reliant upon State consent to substantiate their
240
legitimacy. States comply with decisions emanating from the
Dispute Settlement System because it is conducive to the
241
achievement of their overall aims.
Although most States
include compliance with their international legal obligations
among these aims, if a given institution or its judgments are no
longer viewed as legitimate, the institution will decline and its
242
judgments will not be obeyed.
Given the central role of expectations in legitimating the
WTO, dispute outcomes that fail to cohere with these
expectations pose a risk to the stability and growth of the
the World Trade Organization, transmitted by Note by the Secretariat, para. 16,
U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/17 (June 9, 2004).
238. See John H. Jackson, The WTO ‘Constitution’ and Proposed Reforms: Seven
‘Mantras’ Revisited, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 67, 72 (2001).
239. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
240. See Jürgen Habermas, Does the Constitutionalization of International Law
Still Have a Chance?, in THE DIVIDED WEST 115, 141 (Ciaran Cronin ed. trans.,
2008).
241. Cf. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Does the United States Support International
Tribunals? The Case of the Multilateral Trade System, in THE SWORD AND THE
SCALES: THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 322, 353
(Cesare P. R. Romano ed., 2009).
242. See Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A
Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 908 (2004).
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system. If the effects of institutional practice in creating
expectations which in turn form the basis for governmental
243
decision are significant,
then the downstream impacts of
judicial constitutionalization may be deleterious. The impact of
the adjudicatory organs on WTO legitimacy at the Member
level can be measured with reference to the extent to which
their reports accord with Member expectations. Generalizing
the rights-based constitutional approach of the Telmex Report
so as to consistently resolve disputes in favor of less regulation
is one way to increase certainty regarding the ex ante expected
244
interpretations of the Reference Paper.
It is not clear,
245
however, that such a bias was intended by the negotiators. As
such, a consistent rights-based jurisprudence could erode
Members’ tolerance for delegation of power to the adjudicatory
246
organs. Rulings by the adjudicatory bodies that appear to go
beyond the terms of the current negotiated concessions have a
particularly delegitimizing effect at the WTO because these
outstanding issues are precisely the province of the inter247
Member political decision making process.
As has been
observed, “legitimacy is reduced when policy areas that were
previously the object of authentic and effective political
choices . . . are pre-empted . . . by coming under the control of
248
politically non-accountable authorities.”
Nevertheless, the tendency to advance liberalization
through the adjudicatory bodies is not solely a product of
rights-based constitutional theory, but rather also an
institutional feature of the WTO. As an institutional
phenomenon, the pressure to liberalize through dispute
resolution is a result of the peculiar asymmetry within the
WTO between the efficiency of the dispute settlement system
and the at times intractable nature of the formal rule-making
procedures. This asymmetry creates pressure on the
243. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 19 (1969). On
the centrality of expectations within WTO law see Carmody, supra note 14, at 542;
see also Chios Carmody, WTO Obligations as Collective, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 419,
422–31 (2007).
244. But see Carmody, supra note 14, at 541.
245. See Peng, supra note 10, at 300–01.
246. Cf. Trachtman & Moremen, supra note 22, at 232–35; Regan, supra note
121, at 1315–16.
247. Kumm, supra note 242, at 927; Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra note 4, at 241.
248. FRITZ W. SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC?
26 (1999).
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adjudicatory bodies to bypass the negotiating table and create
249
new rules in the course of adjudication.
The ongoing
standstill of negotiations only serves to heighten the role of
250
dispute resolution in interpreting the agreements. Although
this view has been advanced as a harsh critique of the WTO,
the institutional incentive for rulemaking by the adjudicatory
bodies need not be understood solely as a negative consequence
of the WTO’s structure. As long as panels and the Appellate
Body act within the bounds of the agreed texts, the ability to
create rules through adjudication allows for the possibility of
efficient clarification of otherwise unclear agreements between
Members. As the panel itself noted, the treaties’ “constructive
ambiguity” contributes to reaching a consensus during
negotiations, but leaves treaties open to divergent
251
interpretations in the event of a dispute.
Judicial rulemaking also avoids the political asymmetries and resulting
inefficiencies inherent to the “power-based bargaining” process
which occurs at trade rounds and within the WTO’s formal
252
policy development channels.
Within this nuanced view of judicial rulemaking, a critique
of rights-based constitutionalist interpretation is not to be
equated with a charge of inherent systemic judicial activism
253
within the WTO’s dispute resolution system. Rather, what is
249. See Holmes, supra note 16, at 75; CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE,
SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 38
(2001); John H. Jackson, International Economic Law in Times that are Interesting,
3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 8 (2000).
250. See Peng, supra note 10, at 310–11.
251. Telmex Report, supra note 5, at para. 7.3; see also MIKE MOORE, A WORLD
WITHOUT WALLS—FREEDOM, DEVELOPMENT, FREE TRADE AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 111 (2003); Holmes, supra note 16, at 65; Steinberg, supra note 151,
at 259. The vagueness of the Reference Paper does, however, increase uncertainty
about the outcome of disputes. Cf. Damien Geradin & Michel Kerf, Levelling the
playing field: Is the WTO adequately equipped to prevent anti-competitive practices
in telecommunications, in THE WTO AND GLOBAL CONVERGENCE IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND AUDIO-VISUAL SERVICES 130, 151–53 (Damien Geradin
& David Luff eds., 2004). Note that this deliberate ambiguity is to be distinguished
from the conceptually “open texture” of all rules of law. See H. L. A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 127–28 (2d. ed. 1994).
252. See Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? ConsensusBased Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L. ORG. 339, 341 (2002).
253. See e.g., Roger P. Alford, Reflections on US—Zeroing: A Study in Judicial
Overreaching by the WTO Appellate Body, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 196, 196
(2006–07); John Ragosta, Navin Joneja & Mikhail Zeldovich, WTO Dispute
Settlement: The System is Flawed and Must Be Fixed, 37 INT’L LAW. 697, 698
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interesting is that the issue of constitutionalization, by its very
254
nature, lies at the intersection of law and politics.
By
agreeing to compulsory dispute settlement WTO Members have
implicitly consented to a degree of judicial discretion through
the Dispute Settlement System. This makes it inevitable that a
panel’s views on a matter may come to affect the outcome of a
255
given case. It is only on a naïve view that treaties create a
single immutable legal relationship that is preserved for all
256
time. Therefore, while the rights-based constitutionalism in
the Telmex Report may tell us quite a bit about the theory’s
impact in a given case, the Telmex Report’s impact must be
contextualized to take account of the fact that it represents but
a single sample. Although the Telmex Report demonstrates that
a general conversion to rights-based constitutionalism by the
adjudicatory organs would likely undermine the legitimacy of
the WTO, the response of the Members and the adjudicatory
organs manifests the resiliency of the system. With regard to
the response of the Members, in this case they seemed willing
to accept increased liberalization in the area of
telecommunications perhaps for institutional and sectoral
257
reasons.
Meanwhile, the adjudicatory organs have not
embraced the bold view of the judiciary advocated in rightsbased constitutionalism. To the contrary, the subsequent WTO
jurisprudence has assuaged Members’ potential fears of judicial
overreaching by correcting the most controversial products of
258
the Telmex Report’s rights-based constitutionalism.
Thus,
(2003); cf. Steinberg, supra note 151, at 269–70; Susan Esserman & Robert Howse,
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Services. This panel also implicitly rejected the Telmex Report view of GATS
Article XVI. See Leroux, supra note 13, at 257–58 (noting that the Telmex Report
panel’s understanding of Article XVI “has the effect of turning Article XVI on its
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while the rights-based constitutional approach of the Telmex
Report may have increased the uncertainty regarding WTO
liberalization commitments, this isolated case does not appear
to be a threat to the legitimacy of the WTO.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that the Telmex Report vindicates a
rights-based constitutional theory of the WTO. The contention
that the Telmex Report marks a step-towards rights-based
constitutionalization of the GATS, however, is by no means a
prediction of future constitutionalization. Indeed, even in the
most “constitutionalized” of legal-political regimes, the actual
constitutional structures and rules are in a near constant state
259
of flux. With that said, this article’s analysis shows that
rights-based constitutionalism is not mere “purposeful
scratching of a mainstream itch,” as has been said of other
260
forms of international constitutionalism. Rather, the Telmex
Report shows the potential power of rights-based
constitutionalism as a theory that comes complete not only
with an ideology, but with a specific model of a judiciary as
accomplice in achieving its ideological goals.
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